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İSTANBUL 29 MAYIS ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC
BACKSLIDING IN HUNGARY AND TURKEY**

(YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ)

Yusuf Emre KARAÇAM

Danışman:

Prof. Dr. Michelangelo GUIDA

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bilim Dalı'nda 030119YL04 numaralı Yusuf Emre Karaçam'ın hazırladığı “*Comparative Analysis of Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Turkey*” konulu Yüksek Lisans ile ilgili tez savunma sınavı, 21/01/ 2022 günü 14:00 – 15:00 saatleri arasında yapılmış olup, sorulan sorulara alınan cevaplar sonunda adayın tezinin başarılı olduğuna oybirliği ile karar verilmiştir.

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BEYAN

Bu tezin yazılmasında bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uyulduğunu, başkalarının eserlerinden yararlanılması durumunda bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunulduğunu, kullanılan verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapılmadığını, tezin herhangi bir kısmının bu üniversite veya başka bir üniversitedeki başka bir tez çalışması olarak sunulmadığını beyan ederim.

Yusuf Emre KARAÇAM

21/06/2022

ÖZ

Bu tez Türkiye ve Macaristan'ın demokrasilerinde son dönemde yaşanan güncel olayları mevcut teoriler eşliğinde inceliyor. Her iki ülke demokrasisinin karşılaştığı sorunların tarihsel bağlamda izini sürerek şu anki sonuçlarına dair bir analiz imkânı sunuyor. Tez ekonomik ve sosyolojik teorilerin yanında kutuplaşma ve popülizm gibi son dönemki popüler kavramları derinlemesine inceleyerek güncel sorunlar ile bağlantısını ortaya koyuyor.

Anahtar kavramlar; Türkiye, Macaristan, Otoriterleşme, Kutuplaşma, Popülizm

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to understand the reasons for democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey in terms of the similarities and differences considering the current theories; international pressure, political institutions, economic reasons, social alliance theory, polarization, and populism are aimed to reveal the similar and different sides of both countries.

KEYWORDS: Hungary, Turkey, democratic backsliding, polarization, populism



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ABBREVIATIONS

DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
JDP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
RPP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
PDP	People's Democratic Party (<i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i>)
Fidesz	Hungarian Civic Alliance (<i>Magyar Polgári Szövetség</i>)
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party (<i>Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt</i>)
Jobbik	Movement for a better Hungary (<i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i>)
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party (<i>Magyar Szocialista Párt</i>)
DK	Democratic Coalition (<i>Demokratikus Koalíció</i>)
LMP	Hungary's Green Party (<i>Magyarország Zöld Pártja</i>)
EU	European Union
MDF	The Hungarian Democratic Forum (<i>Magyar Demokrata Fórum</i>)
PSUV	The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (<i>Partido Socialista Unidode Venezuela</i>)

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since Ancient Greece, democracy and regime types have become one of the most contentious topics of political science. Democracy, which had not been around for a long time though, started to enter our lives rapidly in the late eighteenth century. As a result of a tumultuous journey, today it has become the system that provides the greatest guarantee of human rights and freedom. The concepts and definitions attributed to it on this journey began to vary greatly. As a positive development, in the past, the existence of parties and elections was enough for a country to be considered democratic. But today, this is considered as a minimal aspect of modern democracy. In the contemporary world, instead of the concept, elements that evaluate its quality gain importance. It has also become a form of life shaped based on faith and freedom of expression. Especially in the international environment after the 1990s, there was a strong belief that authoritarian states would eventually become liberal democracies. While many states legitimate this expectation, the threats to democracy this time came from within, not from outside. We think that fall of repressive regimes leads to democratic regimes, however, they turned into competitive regimes. The most important question today is whether liberal democracy has been rejected around the world and replaced by some form of populist authoritarian rule. We see powerful indicators pointing to this trend even in the world's largest and most developed democracies such as Trump's USA, Putin's Russia, and Modi's India.

This thesis will present a comparative understanding of the reasons for democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey. We will focus on current backsliding theories like polarization, populism, social coalition theory, political-economic theories, political structure, and international leverage step by step. We will follow Mill's logic as a method of difference and method of difference to compare and contrast Hungary and Turkey (Mill, 2002). At the same time, tracing the roots of the authoritarian understanding in the case of countries by looking at their historical process.

In addition to this introduction and the conclusion at the end, the thesis consists of four main chapters. The first chapter features the theoretical framework of this thesis where our main theories that we apply to our cases. We have used the main theorist's arguments and publications to introduce the main components of the theories. In this chapter, we will introduce some main research questions as presidential democracies are more prone to backslide than parliamentary democracies, in plural societies, constitutional institutions enable better democratic conditions, electoral institutions based on proportional representation can generate political stability. Moreover, we will assess some of the most important party systems like high levels of party-system fractionalization, traditional-party system, dominant-party systems, unbalanced party systems that create potential conditions for backsliding. Then, we will evaluate economic conditions as higher levels of income and is there an organized industrial class that is necessary for democracy. And lastly, we will focus on western leverage and membership in international organizations that makes backsliding slower.

In the second and third chapters, we will apply our theories to Turkey and Hungary and provide an historical background of these countries. We will trace the roots of polarization and analyses populist discourse and its impact on democracy. Then, political economy and political institutions will come into the picture, and we will find out how institutional design produces political instability in our cases. Later, we will focus on social coalition theories and show how business class and political elites have an extensive relationship.

In the last chapter, conclusions and our outcomes are concluded based on the arguments discussed in previous chapters. We will show the differences and similarities that both case countries have. These comparisons and contrasts will provide a far-reaching and deep understanding of case countries.

The following paragraphs introduce the nature of democratic adrift and the theoretical framework that will be used as main causes of democratic backsliding in the world.

1.2 ON DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Throughout history, thinkers endeavor to explain and categorize different kinds of regime types and what kinds of factors their lifecycles depend on. In the aftermath of the Cold War, liberal Western democracy was expected to spread to autocratic states with the collapse of communist systems, and liberal democracy is seen as an endpoint for the political systems (Fukuyama, 1992). At this point, some raised questions that must diverge from authoritarian regimes end up with democracy (Carothers, 2002). However, since democratization has become widespread all over the world, some of the most important skeptical views have started to burgeon before liberal democracies and this leads toward thinking reasons and nature of democratic backsliding. How can newly born democracies have turned to authoritarian regimes? This question has attracted most of the political scientist's attention for a long time. Freedom House published its 2020 report under the name of "democracy under siege". According to the report, 2005 was the last year in which countries remained democratically positive. From this year until today, authoritarian movements have been seen quite intensely. Especially, according to 2020 data, although only 28 countries have increased in terms of democratic values, there has been a decline in democratic values in 73 countries (Freedom House, 2020).

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the rise of Asian states, especially China, overshadow the liberal democracy's claim of problem-solving or good governance. As the search for power and the need for security increased, the move away from liberal values increased. After the 1990s, especially in the former Eastern Bloc countries, the strengthening of the far-right, populist, xenophobic parties that emerged from the liberal democratic order, their coming to the government or becoming government partners in some countries, these parties have harsh criticisms on the liberal democratic regime and international global functioning. These developments have sparked discussions about democratic backsliding.

Scholars have paid a huge amount of attention to this concept, but these efforts to explain the conceptual and theoretical foundations of it are still limited. Democratic backsliding refers to a broad conception and despite it is used at an unprecedented scale, generally, thinkers ignore its nature. We have extensive literature for regime types, but some challenges make it hard to define. When we look at the democratization

process, we see a journey without end that is not a linear movement even in most democratic countries. According to Waldner and Lust, there are three important challenges, and let us examine these factors. The first is the conceptual challenges: which criteria and measurements we should consider? If we look details most probably it will entail a deadlock considering more than 180 countries all over the world. At this point, which field and factors we need to evaluate for democratic backsliding are really hard questions before thinkers. The second problem is methodological: which methods fit best to explain regime-changing? Finally, theoretical challenges are represented by the vast literature we do not have a general theory to explain democratic backsliding.

In a minimalist manner, Nancy Bermeo (2016) explains it as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” As you see, political scientists use this term to identify changes that replace democratic values with more authoritarian values in formal and informal institutions.

We can use these changes to refer to situations where competition in the electoral field is diminishing in favor of the ruling party. In general, incumbents' administrative power increases and they move to a stronger position than other institutions. The forces begin to deteriorate in favor of the separation that hurts. They try to gain an advantage over other parties by changing constitution at will, for example increasing the duration of their duty and designing electoral system according to the places where the party is in majority. On the playing field, the pressure is applied to other actors, for example, while restricting the movement area of the opposition, the platforms where they can express themselves are reduced. Media, which is a vital element for transparency, is intimidated by fear and punishment, and if necessary, journalists are given prison sentences. Civil liberties are violated on a case-by-case basis. This process continues slowly but without interruption. But these together go beyond the protests that might occur by manipulating incumbent civil society. Using this manipulation with media, they try to gain an advantage by clouding the water instead of making irregular indirect selections (Dresden and Howard, 2016).

Two points become targets, these are constitutional balance mechanisms and the judiciary. When we look at the party structures and leaders that led to the democratic regression, we often see that populist parties predominate. Especially two

features draw the observers' attention, the first is that the populist parties claim to be the true representatives of the people and promise the real owners of the country to fight for the people against foreign powers, corrupt elites, and oligarchs (Grzymala-Busse, 2017). This give legitimacy to the anti-democratic laws they make in the eyes of the people and claim that some war crimes should be ignored as a war against an enemy.

Democratic backsliding means that the main components of democracy come under threat. First, free, and fair elections lose the main dynamics for fair competition. And according to Dahl, free and fair elections are inseparable complement to democracy (Dahl, 1998). In general, an election is a phenomenon of voters' determining their preference over the different options offered to them. In the political sense, an election is the determination of the representatives of the people who will rule them. Although elections are one of the basic tools of democracy, election alone is not regarded as an indicator of democratic rule. Elections are contingent upon the democratic legitimacy of the administration, the freedom of organization of the parties representing different views, and the ability to compete in a free environment, free from any kind of pressure. Elections with a single party and a single candidate cause the will of the government to replace the will of voters and become the implementation tool of dictatorial administrations. Such formal elections are incompatible with representative democracy and do not determine the true will of the people. Elections are only valid to the extent that they are made in a free and pluralistic environment, in accordance with the principles of generality, equality and confidentiality, and honestly. In democracies, the individual is not a completely state-dependent subject (subject), but a political subject or citizen who, with its free will, contributes to the formation of the government and to make political decisions. The rulers derive their powers of power not from God, but from the elected will of the ruled, in other words from the approval. The election provides the transformation of individual will determined by the given votes into a social will. There are also choices and elections in countries such as China and Cuba, but these choices indicate a limited option because the playground and system are designed in favor of a party. This has brought us to the most important indicator of democracy, that is, to the point of whether a change of power has occurred. In other words, a change of a ruling party should happen.

1.3 MEASURING DEMOCRACY

Today, the concept and phenomenon of democracy have been significantly successful in introducing this key concept of modern political science almost indisputably into the language of politics. Even the opponents of democracy focused on it in the language of politics they use; they direct their criticisms to the contemporary forms of democracy rather than to counter-democracy. However, no doctrine is equally accepted by all about what democracy is. There are several attempts to define democracy that have been criticized from various perspectives. For example, popular sovereignty, equality, participation, majority sovereignty, tolerance, limitation of sovereignty, control of sovereignty, fundamental rights, separation of powers, rule of law, social state, multi-party system, general elections, openness, freedom of thought, pluralism, etc. like. For this reason, various theories of democracy have emerged that place different emphasis on these elements.

When we try to define what is democracy, the concept of democracy needs to be operationalized. Operationally defining the concepts, that is, making them measurable, requires being empirical in principle. Although it is possible to make operational definitions of directly observable phenomena, empirically invisible concepts such as norms, values, and beliefs need to be made measurable, in other words, concretized in a sense. Thus, the concrete existence of a conceptually defined phenomenon is determined and to what extent. In past, we can calculate democratic backsliding easily because of its blatant forms, however, during the post-Cold war, these forms transform into subtler forms. In other words, democratic backsliding occurs when undermining democratic values and we evaluate these attempts clearly in past such as military coup d'état and fraud in elections. Compared to the past, it is hard to evaluate these new subtle forms such as debilitation of democratic institutions and constraints on media freedoms (Bermeo, 2016).

After the 2000s different kinds of democracy indexes have become popular. Especially Freedom House has published current situations and recent developments of countries in terms of democratic measurements. According to reports of Freedom House some there are some signs of democratic backsliding in some countries.

Although of some criticisms, reports of Freedom House are widely used to explain democratic situations. Another important index is Vanhanen, there are two key dimensions of Dahl's polyarchy theory based on Vanhanen's democracy index, which deals with the democratization of various countries in different studies: a degree of inclusion and degree of competitiveness. These measurements are important in a minimalist perspective and evaluate data, however, it ignores some of the most important civic democratic values such as rule of law or degree of freedom of expression.

The Economist Intelligence Democracy Index provides a “more minimal” definition of democracy that underlines factors such as quality of governance. At this point, some criticism was raised against these measurements in terms of taking core concepts as liberal Western democracies and some of the most important lacking in measurements tools (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). As you see there is a huge amount of debate on measurements, but they are still having advantages and show a generic overview of democracy. The difficulty in making an acceptable definition of democracy increases even more in measuring democracy. Therefore, it is not easy to measure democracy. However, important attempts have been made and are being made to measure democracy. To do this, there is a need for reliable, robust, standardized measurement tools as possible in the scientific comparison of domination orders.

1.4 EXPLAINING THE CAUSES OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Democratic withdrawal can never be attributed to one single cause. Because many different reasons need to sustain democracy, therefore, at least, a few of them must be eroded to cause backsliding. But when we examine the examples, we can see that democratic backsliding is caused by similar people and problems. We see that the elected person can increase their power capacity through non-democratic means and finally reach unlimited power. For this purpose, they gradually erode institution's check and balance mechanisms. While in past, military leaders caused democratic backsliding, recently we see that backsliding threats come from civilian elected leaders. The human factor underlies all systems. It is also where the main danger for these systems lies. Some people in every system are prone to corruption. We can see this not

only in democracies but also in ideologically based regimes. Stalin's position in the Soviet Union is a compelling example of this. Today, we see a trend of falling in military coups, which means that the threat to democracy comes from civilian leaders rather than the military. One of the reasons for this is that the needs of the people in a democratic system cannot be met by democratic governments (Hakim 2003: 122). Authoritarian and charismatic leaders are more comfortable in exercising both legal and emotional authority over government forces. In addition, the organizational skills of the authoritarian leader are far superior to their competitors, as a result, it is easy for them to combine the party and state's institutions to a point. Now, let's examine theoretical causes of democratic backsliding.

1.5 POLARIZATION

Polarization may be all the social relations in a country range from political ideology to ethnic identity. When we talk about polarization, most people think over ideological or ethnic identity, however we can see every aspect of daily social life in a country clearly the dividing line can be seen as a guarantee of democracy and help to deepen democratic consolidation; however, it can be a negative and pernicious effect on democracy and can trigger democratic backsliding. If competitive groups keep going on at balance this can be seen as a healthy democracy, on the other hand since if one group seeks to dominate others and stay in power, this will give huge damage to democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Competitive perspective turns into adversary camps and “us” vs “them”.

All nations have different kinds of social cleavages among citizens, some of them are realized cleverly in terms of ethnic identity and language, moreover, these factors turn to political pressure and political mobilization in some countries. However, some of them are really hidden in people's social life. Even most homogenized countries in the world such as Hungary can face social polarization and we must know how they can turn to democratic backsliding.

It is critical to find when and where these fault lines turn to decay democracy. At this point, we find Somer and McCoy's studies on this topic, and they identify three kinds of grievances. The first is about political grievances, unfortunately, all segments

of a nation could not reach political representatives at the same time. For example, colors and Latinos in the USA that take a long way to achieve these universal rights. To be more specific, these excluded segments must fight against a ruling class to capture fundamental rights, and this leads to societal conflict, we see a compelling example of this in the American Civil War. In addition, some of these societal classes feel excluded and as a stranger to their own government.

Every society has different political, cultural, economic, intellectual, legal, and historical data. In every country, there are groups of people who suffer and feel excluded in various ways. Even an intellectual or rich family member who has enough money, a job, and status may feel isolated and excluded from the society in which he/she lives. At this point, these groups seek a political movement, and this is an opportunity for political challengers to seize power such as Chavez in Venezuela. The second grievance refers to economic conditions, short-term economic crises create favorable conditions for the rise of populist leaders because, during extraordinary times like economic crises and famine, people seek much more radical changes and rapid actions, in these times, some leaders could manipulate for political changes and reform in economy easily with generally imaginary promises. This opens doors to these leaders for government. We can look at these examples *Orbán's Fidesz* into office in Hungary in 2010 and JDP in Turkey after bitter economic crises in Turkey and we will improve these ideas in the subsequent chapters. Another important point is about long-term economic inequality, especially recently citizens in Western countries begin to lose their trust in a liberal market economy and demand more redistributive policies. Sometimes liberal market and liberal democracy see as same things they look more skeptic liberal values, moreover, when migration join to picture, liberal and traditional parties come under huge pressure from populist and extremist parties such as *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany and *Front national* in France that promise more solidaristic economic policies against liberal market economy, and this drives the attention of most of the citizens. The last grievances are cultural ones, different cultures and lifestyles can be a fault line and shape political decisions is called *Kulturkampf*, Conservative lifestyle and secularized life may conflict sometimes and create troubled in-country via counter-protests like Iran. These topics are about predominantly moral debates that it is hard to find a commonplace.

At this point, Pippa Norris (2019) contributes a famous theory is called 'Cultural Backlash'. This theory provides a good structure to understand why people seek strong leaders to lead them when cultural backlash happened. After the 1990s new generations were born in the information and computer age, the main dynamics of the world has changed, and a new generation has begun to take place of elders. It means that there is a value shift between young and elders. Old generations were born in insecure conditions, some of them see the second world war and others see harsh economic crisis and grow in abject poverty. These events have a profound impact on their characteristic features and mindsets. They take care of materialistic values like security and money. On the other hand, new generations grow up in much more secure conditions than their elders and experience a welfare state, high income, and employment, and this makes them more tolerant about moral topics. Moreover, most of them go to college and universities provide cultural hubs and a lot of students coming from different classes and ethnicities. Moreover, most parts of our society live in urban areas and intense migration to these places create a cosmopolitan environment and melting pot for several cultures. These millennium generations live in such an environment that adept mobile phones in which social media has a positive impact on liberal values and their mindset focus on human rights, freedom of expression, sexual preferences, and changes in gender role and take care of these liberal values when they vote. We see a value shift from materialistic values to post-materialistic values. At this point we must take one group into account: who is the loser of this process? Who has not to share the same values and evaluate these developments as moral decay and immoral values? This brings us to a tipping point that political reaction has begun among those who feel angry. The cultural backlash has reached to top point and this group seeks mobilization. When this angry group becomes a majority, they do not feel that minorities or immigrants threaten themselves, however, while they remain approximately 45 percent of the total population, they see this number like 15 percent and feel an inevitable threat coming from outsiders. These thinking make them seek strong leaders who are merciless, a leader who pushes back progressive process and does not take care of it is politically correct (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Hostility to 'outsiders' threats to group norms and values, racial/ethnic minorities, Islamophobia.

Misogyny, homophobia, and antisemitism gain importance in public debate, and people seek a hero during these times.

One of the most important dimensions of pernicious polarizing is a discourse that aims to separate voters into two opposite groups. They use some negative frames for other groups and depict them as evil rather than showing themselves who hold only true moral values. These discourses draw people to take action that holds positive views toward their group and negative stereotype for other groups (Kinder and Kam, 2009). Othering also involves attributing negative characteristics to people or groups that differentiate them from the perceived normative social group. It is an “us vs. them” way of thinking about human connections and relationships. At this point, these feelings increase increasingly loyalty feeling and belonging to own in-group, on the other hand, it provokes feelings of aversion for other groups (Gaertner, 1993). The rise of distrust and fear reduces dialogue opportunities between groups.

Another important factor is how polarization has been used as a tool to stay in power for incumbents. First, when you have reached your own majority, you can rule without not taking opposition's demand into account. Then ally with smaller parties that cannot reach majority on their own. Another important side is how opposition parties can use polarization? Sometimes opposition groups can mobilize themselves and show their dissatisfaction through street protests and some demonstrations via using polarizing language. However, they have attracted harsh criticism from antagonizing pro-government groups (Somey and McCoy, 2018).

When we look at consequences for a democratic process, we see that winning majority rises a threat that hegemonic elites and incumbents easily lead to democratic erosion with their legislature share. The second threat is about using aggressive discourse toward opponents and sees them as delegitimize enemies of a nation in which has dark relations with external forces. Especially partisanship increases and make voters perceive opposition parties are a threat against a national value and even independence of their countries. Therefore, they can ignore incumbent's anti-democratic steps on behalf of future of country (Svolik, 2018). In addition, delegitimizing discourse toward media, legislature and state institutions have a pernicious effect on trust of citizens in these concepts and institutions. Incumbents seek to assuage public's trust in legitimacy of political system.

However, sometimes discourse of opponents contributes to deep political polarization. Yannis Stavrakakis highlights those democracies need to produce real options that provide a common place for all segments and groups (Stavrakakis, 2018). However, traditional politicians and parties have used dehumanize language against populist wave and its supporters. This discourse is as harmful as populist parties. It provokes pro-government groups or pro-populist groups that consolidate polarization in a pernicious way. Slater and Arugay (2018) build the same ideas on this rhetoric, they highlight that conflict between groups and segments in democratic mechanisms are inevitable, but it is vital to avoid their turning into Machiavellian tension. At this point, we must add that polarization can be beneficial if it does not turn into conflict. Lebas (2011) called that ‘generative conflict.’ However, she elaborates that it is crucial at what does a beginning point of pernicious polarization? If it comes from any exclusion of one ethnic group or oppressed groups that seek equal citizenship rights, most probably it will turn to a civil war or large-scale violence. Secondly, she gives importance to a balance of power between factions, and this balance keeps democracy healthy and stable. Accountable and independent institutions help to maintain this political system and prevent anti-establishment groups to reach power. Because polarizing politics encourage populist parties to build a hegemony over state and parties like Chavez’s PSUV in Venezuela or *Victor Orbán’s Fidesz*. During lack of these stable checks and balances, parties seek more executive power through constitutional implements and divide opposition blocs. Webster (2018) draws our attention to the individualistic perspective and impact of partisanship. He points out that voters can be affected by former and polarizing discourse and increasingly develop resentment against the opposing political party and its voters. Another important contribution coming from Milan Svolik (2019) who draws our attention to deep feelings toward leaders. Harshly polarized countries have experienced a debate on political leaders and are divided into two parts pro-leaders or anti-leaders. At this point, some of the most important political demands or actions can be ignored because leaders take a central place of electorate campaign and his/her destiny has seen an inseparable part of a country. He highlights those voters face democratic values and partisan interests, and a polarized environment pushes them to sacrifice liberal values in favor of the latter.

1.6 DESIGN OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Democracy establishes institutions range from government organizations to political parties. We give so much importance to democratic political institutions that put pressure on governments to become more transparent and responsive to citizens. These institutions make a political system gains legitimacy in eyes of a public and provides a platform for accountability for citizens. Moreover, these can have a profound impact on preventing government members to act anti-democratically. Despite political institutions sometimes face with strong initiatives and pressure from incumbents to change their inner dynamics in favor of themselves, they can put some barriers in front of incumbents acting perniciously. However, we should not forget that these institutions are not something coming from external areas to make pressure but inside state organizations and can manipulate by incumbents. As a result of these facts, we will examine a relationship between political institutions and democracy.

One of the most eminent political thinkers is Linz (1990) that draws our attention to the comparison between parliamentary and presidential regimes that presidential democracies are more prone to breakdown than parliamentary democracies. According to Linz, although parliamentary democracies can become unstable under harsh ethnic tension, most of the time it has mechanisms to appease these divergences and four characteristic features make the presidential system more prone to democratic breakdown. Linz has found that parliament is the only legitimate institution that a government derived from, thus a government's authority is limited confidence of parliament. On the other hand, presidents in presidential systems hold excessive power that can establish full control on an administration that takes their power from popular votes that can make arrangement elections in their favor independently from parliament. Secondly, fixed office terms prevent a quick reflection and backlash that parliament should apply in case of emergency. Thirdly and more importantly, the division of legitimacy between legislators and executives generates a conflict between them. Because both take their authority from popular votes and have right to claim true representatives of people, especially there is a strong ideological party in parliament. Moreover, no such mechanism resolves unlocked problems that block the policy-making process. Even sometimes we see military power take a role as

mediating power. After a careful comparison, Linz receives four fundamental conclusions that the political system plays a role in a democratic collapse. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) has opposed Linz's arguments and claim that Linz has selected poor-low income and the richest countries to compare and such a comparison does not produce suitable results. This can be true criticism but more importantly, Linz's arguments made in the 1990s that mid of second reverse wave and beginning of third democratization wave. It means that during this period especially Latin American countries are popular and ruled by a presidential system that suffering from regular military coups. However, after the 2000s, we see a new paradigm in democratic backsliding that much more about reversing the democratic system rather than overthrow it.

Another important point is the origin of systems from where these regimes come. Cheibub (2007) makes some of the most important contributions that taking Latin American cases finds that those democracies established after military dictatorships turn to presidential systems substantially, while those democracies that derive civilian dictatorships are far more likely to be parliamentary systems. At this point, we need to examine the roots of a democratic system.

Stephen Reynolds (2011) takes another perspective about institutions and thinks that majoritarian political institutions, separation of power create incentives to accommodate others and thus prevent democratic breakdown. To be more specific, if electoral systems have been designed as inclusive for all groups based on proportional representations, it will become successful to prevent and appease ethnic and ideological conflicts among fractions.

According to Mainwaring (1993), a high level of party system fractionalization can harm democracy. In other words, two-party systems or limited multi-party systems are more prone to sustain democratic processes than multi-party systems. While a lot of parties compete for electoral gaining, political instability becomes more likely. Another important contribution of Mainwaring is about the relationship between party structure and leaders. When the loyalty of individuals toward a party is low, many politicians have changed parties to run for their interests and political career. Election campaigns focus on individuals rather than the party and its ideology. A candidate seems more emphasized than a party. All these result from weak institutionalized party

structures. Mainwaring discusses that the effect of poor institutionalization leads to a clientelism relationship that triggers democratic backsliding. Leaders backed on the support of businessmen rather than organizing party structure to gain votes and election campaign in Brazil. Thus, have a pernicious impact on democratic institutions and policy implementation (Mainwaring, 1999).

Seawright (2012) points out that the collapse of traditional-party systems provides ground for democracy to be subverted from above. Therefore, subversion in democracy becomes more likely if traditional party's collapse. Elimination of political elite with collapse of traditional political parties opens space for different political projects who can be threatening for democracy. When voters abandon traditional parties, can shift quickly back political challengers up. Another significant contribution is studied by LeBas (2011) suggests that if there are a dominant-party and relatively weaker parties that compete in elections, it could create pressure on the dominant party to distort other parties, therefore this is making backsliding more likely in dominant party systems. Another important point is about mobilizing the capacity of parties. A democratic regime can be threatened by unequal party systems that one of parties has greater ability and resources to mobilize voters than its opposition has. Especially divisions that come from ideological ground could push political actors to take anti-democratic actions. This idea claims that fractionalization among political parties is less harmful to democracy than unevenness in parties' levels of grassroots mobilization. Because this unbalanced party capacity may be particularly threatening to nascent democracies if more powerful parties have a profound impact on policy-making process that contains exclusive policies for under-represented minorities of society (Lust and Waldner, 2016).

Another important point is about vote volatility among voters. Especially, it gives clues for evaluating party stability. At this point, Hazama warns that nascent democracies may have high volatility that leads to democratic decline.

1.7 POPULISM

1.7.1 THE NATURE OF POPULISM

I would like to start this section by highlighting some words from the famous speech of Pericles. What did he say, Pericles; not of a few but the whole society, equality before the law, a model to others, we are free, we usually win by ourselves, not based on social classes. In these words, we encounter intense populism. Pericles says what the public wants to hear directly. He gives a speech in which their general will, and wishes are reflected very well. The basic elements of populism are very well reflected in this conversation. The collective will be placed on individual will, and general will is constantly emphasized. The public and the management feel strong in a past position and that all layers of the public can take place in management. Another aspect is his emphasis on his rivals Sparta and its allies. He tells the public that Sparta and the others are in a strong alliance against Athens while fighting on their own. Pericles gives us a good example of the basic features of populism in this way.

The ongoing debate on the essence of populism suggests that some scholars argue that populism cannot be a meaningful concept in social sciences; some have also seen it as a normative term that should be limited to the media and politics. Although inconclusive is understandable, the term populism is too central to be dismissed in discussions about politics in many parts of the world.

When looking at the world political history, populism can gain different content depending on the conditions of the environment in which it is located and developed. Populism is a phenomenon that does not recognize the concept of time and space, and each period has some amount in every country. We cannot say that there is a complete consensus on the definition of thoughts. Populism has attracted the attention of different thinkers and politicians. As a result, it has been a subject of intense research, especially by theories such as structuralism. According to Muddle (2004), the biggest obstacle in his definition of the concept stems from his having chameleonic nature. Due to the nature of populism, it can suddenly become a very different form, and the shape change rate and propagation tools can develop and change quickly. The most suitable environment for populism, which is the reference point, is undoubtedly democracies. Democracies always create a suitable ground for populism. Considering these assessments, it can be said that the whole democratic political process is populist because of the necessity of building a people and its references are public. In other

words, populism is a derivative of politics, and therefore no political movement can be completely exempt from populism.

According to Canovan (1984), some researchers who focus on this issue on the grounds of democracy, envision populism as an ideology, because the sovereignty of the people is defended. In this framework, the definition is made in the form of opposing the established power structure and the dominant ideas and values of the society in the name of the people. What distinguishes it from other anti-power movements is that it also opposes valid elite judgments and opinion leaders on this path. With this feature, it can adopt statism in a manner appropriate to the structure of the power and existing elites, while defending liberalism to oppose state intervention when necessary. However, the common point of all is that in all cases, they are the spokesperson of the whole society, not as a spokesperson of a social class or segment, but as a spokesperson. This attitude, which is the basis of the characteristic of the concept, reveals the charismatic leadership, which is assumed to represent the whole of the people, which it poses as one of the requirements of populism, and this results in the form of leadership in front of the political parties that represent certain classes or segments of the people.

On the other hand, some researchers adopt populism as a technique used to get popular support and increase it. Given the fact that non-populist political parties or leaders in democracies propaganda towards the people to get their votes, the question of what differences are between them, and populist discourses raises a perspective of political communication. Wodak states that populist rhetoric cannot be limited only as a political form belonging to right- or left-wing parties (Wodak, 2015). In this perspective, it seems that populism has declared itself the starting point of the construction of a new or more radical new order of both the shaking of the existing situation and the shaking situation. Popular identities act using the chains of equivalence resulting from undue demands that are met because of (economic/democratic) crises. They find themselves in the hegemony process, which begins at the point where any request represents a chain of equivalence.

Based on the findings of authors such as Hall and Burack (2014), we can say that populist movements are often led by a charismatic leader. The person who will change the whole system and save them from this disaster system. Throughout history,

different groups and individuals have had a strong belief that their destiny was written for a purpose. These people emerge especially in moments of hope and all those who oppose cruel masters. It will purify the values and system of the nation and send it to the solution. It will establish a powerful nation and bring the values in the historical period back to the surface. For example, Ronald Reagan's famous phrase "Restoring America to Americans", which plays a big role in the organization of the right-wing in America, reflects this situation very well. The belief that these leaders will achieve an absolute victory, especially against the enemies of the nation, is widespread. Especially symbolization is very important. The founding values and events of the country are transformed into symbols, and the missing values of the nation are rediscovered, and the enemies are overcome. A single, unwavering leader comes up to bring the nation back to that period.

According to Muddle (2007), populism is certainly an ideology that divides society into two different groups as homogeneous and antagonistic groups. One of them is "Pure people" and the other is corrupt elites. And a strong belief that policies must reflect the will and desires of the "pure" people. Secondly, there are distinctive definitions for both groups that define their homogeneity and enemies. Especially, the differences between the two groups are constantly emphasized. It means we are good, oppressed, and honest but they are bad, liars, and cruel. Thirdly, there must be a strong fear that we are constantly threatened by others. This fear must be physically defined, and the public must feel deeply. Emotional intensity should increase, and enemies are described with vague words. For example, the "Irish in us" is a very good example for Turkey. There is a concept that characterizes, but it does not always have to be someone to fill the concept. Lastly, on the other hand, this separation, dividing it into pure people and corrupt elite, cannot be evaluated according to any scientific or experimental data.

The differences between the two groups should be emphasized continuously. These differences are often used to identify existing elite groups. Because the public has been forgotten and pushed to one side. They must rise to power again because they live under horrible living conditions, whereas the main reason for the nation is the people. While the corrupt elites or minority groups were the most beneficial groups of the country, the real owners of a nation and forgotten people were constantly crushed. Their psychological states are as follows; While those who suffer to save their

homeland in dangerous times, they cannot get the gift at peace period. Moreover, their cultures are constantly perceived as threatened.

When we look at populist people and groups, they introduce themselves to the public as if they were their representatives. They must protect the interests of the people against corrupt corruption. Especially they look as if they are against the rich elite group. But they often establish a strong relationship with powerful rich elites. Then they try to create their own rich elite. The projects that have been prepared are elitist projects. In addition to this, cultural and economic conditions prepare the appropriate ground for the right-wing to be raised. Especially economic factors and crises are great opportunities for conservative parties to come to power. Immediately afterwards, they produce policies to support and assist the middle class. Cultural corruption has always been a focus. The lost values of the people must be found again and bear a sensitive future. Right-wing populism has some common elements in the global context. Most importantly, they maintain economic growth and adapt their identity policies based on nationalism and religion very effectively. Recently, a new element has been added to these policies, which is to adapt aggressive foreign policy to internal policy.

Another feature of populism is that it uses propaganda methods very successfully. They adapt especially to new media techniques very quickly and start using them. They give special meanings to the words they use especially for the media. Because some words must be constantly twisted in communication with the public. For example, the concept of “freedom” means a safe country away from external forces and where the influence of corrupt groups disappears, does not mean human rights. The messages are leader oriented. Leaders and their messages should come to the agenda instead of daily issues.

Populists strongly emphasize that the current system fails to fill public desires, the system makes its own citizens disappointed. However, they generally reduce system problems to one single reason. These are generally external forces, corrupt elite classes, or minority groups. Because one group or somebody should be kept responsible for any horrible situation in the country.

At this point, the lines drawn by Müller will help us to at least define a boundary. First, Müller makes a distinction between demagogues and populists, saying that populists can only exist in representative systems. Populists are not against the

representative system but see themselves as legitimate representatives of the real people. The second feature is their anti-pluralist character. They tend to see society as homogeneous, so that the people and groups he sees as rivals are not part of the real public. The third feature makes their position strong against empirical refutation by positioning them as the true representative of the people. A fourth feature is that they make the decisions to a referendum and ask for their approval of the will they have created. The fifth feature is that they want to govern society according to their principles. This can lead to results such as mass clientelism, corruption, and the suppression of critical civil society. They may even want to write a partisan constitution to keep the government in their hands (Müller, 2016). Thus, it can be seen that populism can consist of the existence of these elements.

1.8 THEORIES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL COALITIONS

Unlike other theories that see citizens as a homogenized group, these theory groups focus on tectonic plates of a nation such as economic and sociocultural divisions among citizens. In terms of interest-based divisions such as class divisions, these classes can support different policies in different parties based on their materialistic interests. Sociocultural differences refer to ethnicity, race, language, etc. and most nations face different kinds of these divisions. In democracies, citizens have several identities that sometimes overlap each other. Under these circumstances, political parties and leaders need a coalition to pursue power. Democracies establish a triangular system between party, voters and businessman that is based on exchange capital, vote and state-controlled resources. Each leader must fit some needs of supporters that keep leader in office (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003). Bueno makes an astounding contribution that introduces survival reasons for winning coalitions in democracies. His main arguments: incumbents determine the tax rate for state revenue, then invest these revenues in some policies that favor them to hold power, especially for sustaining support of coalition members. Public and private goods are distributed to the only member of the winning coalition that leads to the expansion size of the group.

Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) emphasizes the importance of the bourgeoisie class in the transition to democracy, and compare the factors that cause the formation

of the social roots of democratic, fascist, and communist regimes - existing methods of production, social class structure and industrialization, etc. Moore argues that there are three routes to modernization, studying the history of six countries — England, France, America, China, Japan, and India. The first of these routes pass through the bourgeois revolution. Moore argues that countries such as Britain, France, and America that experienced this revolution reached the result of democratic capitalism. Countries such as Japan and Germany where the peasant class was weak experienced conservative revolutionary movements, the second route in modernization, and as a result, fascist regimes emerged in these countries. The peasant revolution constitutes the last route to modernization. Moore argued that countries such as China and Russia have slowed down the modernization and democratization movements of the powerful peasant class, in which communist regimes revealed. He claims that he prepared the ground for his emergence. Finally, Moore examines India as an outlier outside these three groups. For India, while economically belongs to the preindustrial age, it is politically close to the Western world. In other words, although India did not experience a bourgeois revolution and could not industrialize economically, India can be no democracy without the bourgeoisie and cannot fit well with his thesis is a situation. Consequently, Moore claims Democracy is more likely if such a social class exist and its capacity to impose democracy over the opposition of social classes with subverting preferences. having a weak bourgeoisie can trigger democratic backsliding. In this thesis, we will examine the democratic roots of Hungary and Turkey and the impact of the close relationship with the West.

Moore has called the final route of modernization by studying peasant revolution or revolution from below (revolution from below) by studying China and Tsarist Russia. According to Moore, democratization like China and Russia, which does not have a strong middle class and is experiencing a peasant revolution, is prevented and communist regimes appear. The factors causing the peasant revolution can be listed as follows. First, societies that are divided along with punishment are favorable to peasant revolution because they can form another segment in the opposing row.

It lays the groundwork for the central government to form the revolution of the revolution in society to achieve the bureaucracy (agricultural bureaucracy) or economic

surplus. If the owner cannot bring a commercial dimension to upper-class agriculture or cut off the link of the peasant and his field, the peasants remain strong, and in the first case they are dissatisfied with the usual situation, they go on the path of revolution.

Rueschemeyer (1992) points out that reaching modern liberal democracy requires a full developed industrial class that pushes middle and working classes to seek more accountability. Lack of industrial class and middle class can trigger democratic backsliding. These kinds of theories were popular till the beginning of 2002s, nevertheless, they take the main example of first and the second democratization waves.

1.9 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND LEVERAGES

The main thing that distinguishes the theories in this group from the other theory families is that it connects democracy to external rather than local factors. Such theories discuss the pressure on local politicians for democratization steps through foreign repression and foreign policy instruments. Foreign policy pressure can be military or economic. We see regime changes in Germany and Japan intervened by military occupations. Apart from that, some periodic policies that encouraged democratization by using a carrot and stick policy and some incentives were also implemented by Western liberal powers, especially during Cold War by the USA and later by European Union.

Levitsky and Way (2010) make the main contribution to these theories by coining the term competitive authoritarianism in literature. In their famous studies, they emphasize how international dimensions have a profound impact on democratization process and when its impact disappears, how democratic adrift take place. According to this study, five mechanisms has played a key role that let's look at them one by one. Firstly, via increasing communication methods, successful democratic neighboring countries become role-model for others and local started to push for democratization. The second mechanism is about direct democracy promotion that aims to change regime by military methods that happen in Haiti and Panama but the USA. The third mechanism is multilateral conditionality that is mostly applied by the EU. If these countries show a positive trend, they can reach a carrot, which is external aid. The

fourth mechanism is democracy assistance that especially international organizations support its member's civic culture. And finally, transnational advocacy network that monitoring organizations thrived in numbers recently across the world and enabled more transparency. However, this depends on two things: western leverage and linkage to the West. Governments and their institutions should be weak against western pressure for democratization, if a structure is hard, it means that they can show resistance that this is what happened in the Russian Federation. In other words, if these countries are powerful in terms of economy and military, their bargain power is increasing against Western pressure. Another important point is about countries' strategic locations and importance. If these countries are important for foreign interest, it means that pressure will decrease for example oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia. And second and the last dimension is linkage to the West. These countries should have strong ties with the West in terms of economic, social, information, and technocratic. If elites have relations with these countries and citizens are familiar with them via tourism or education, this leads to more pressure on governments for reforms. Moreover, we emphasize that Hungary is a EU member country and Turkey is a candidate country. Recently EU has lost pull and push power and a global recession is seen in all liberal markets and illiberal ideas gain speed (Öniş and Kutlay, 2019).

Another theory is about the increasing possibility of democratic transition if neighboring countries are democratic. A spillover effect can occur between countries. If one country is surrounded by democratic power, it decreases the possibility of democratic backsliding and increases democratization demand from the public. On the other hand, the absence of leverage can encourage authoritarian leaders to escape from democratization pressure that leads to democratic backsliding (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006).

Another theory focuses on the importance of membership in international organizations. This hypothesis claims that memberships create interconnections with liberal countries, which helps to monitor current democratic situations and these organizations can take some actions to improve further democratization to some extent. Moreover, linkage and leverage can be an obstacle in front of abuses of human rights among member countries because they worry about backlash for other member states. In addition, member countries cannot want to be in the same picture with one that has

violent human rights because it harms countries prestigious (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). At this point, Hyda (2007) adds another contribution of International Organizations. Monitoring features enable accountability and transparency in member countries and deter leaders from anti-democratic policies. Moreover, Independent observers can guarantee to prevent election-day fraud effectively that keeps democratic trust higher.

1.10 THEORIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Theories linking structural-economic factors to regime types have become a central theme of regime transitions, democratization, and even democratic backsliding. These studies based on a rich data set provide a general overview of democratic quality. Scholars generally focus on some key concepts such as level of income, distribution of income, source of income, and short-term macroeconomic performance. According to modernization theories, economic development that we can include complex economic sector, professionalized workgroups, increase of privatization and technological change is the main precondition for a democratic process (Lipset, 1959). Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1997) rephrase Lipset's ideas and focus on the level of income as the main base for the survival of democracies. Przeworski's theory of survival says that it is not known where and how democracy emerged but can only survive in societies with a high level of prosperity, since if someone with an average living and living in a democratic country becomes a dictatorship, it is unlikely that they will maintain their current level of life. On the other hand, while a narrow circle close to the government lives in prosperity, the majority is poor, so it is difficult for a democracy with a high level of welfare to turn into a dictatorship. but in countries where there are most people with nothing to lose, the possibility of taking part in the ruling circle. In other words, income level is crucial for the maintenance of democracy. At this point, we can add another dimension that the rise of income will cause to produce educated citizens who are easy to embrace democratic and liberal values. Consequently, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi's ideas income level has a profound impact on democratic backsliding. Boix and Stokes (2002), and later by Boix (2003), take

oppose action that increasing of income are linked with both possibilities for democratization and lower chance of democratic backsliding. Boix also claims that outcomes of higher inequality reduce the request of society for democratization. Muller and Seligson (1987) point that inequality gives huge damage to political stability and causes complex situations.

Przeworski (1997), on the other hand, emphasizes that the interest proposition of democracies as a product of economic development is not valid by going through Lipset's work. He says that income is not important in the emergence stage of democracies, but it will be effective in ensuring the sustainability of democracies in the stage after the establishment of democracies, which in a way supports the work of Lipset.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) contribute the same ideas that the effect of income inequality on democratization and collapse. As the income gap between groups rises, democracy's costs for the wealthy rise, reducing the chance of democratic transitions. To be more specific, economic inequality needs redistributive policies, and democracies provide more redistributive mechanisms. For example, in England, The Elementary Education Act of 1870 enables a universal education right that was passed between 1870 and 1893 to create compulsory education. We see the same redistributive policies in France and Weimar State that literacy rates had increased at an unprecedented rate since 1880 (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). At this point, we have added that if political institutions of these democracies fail to enable redistribution and fail to prevent to expand economic inequality, most probably distrust of public will spread and lose their credit to democratic governance and this will open a door for political challenger that promise new wealth system. Boix, Acemoglu and Robinson agree on that if income inequality rises, richer begin afraid of demands comes from poor segments of society for redistributive policies.

Another important point with high levels of economic inequality or low capital mobility, elites try to undermine democratic rule due to their fear of redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). Because in case of high inequality demand that coming from bottom for redistributive policies have huge pressure on elites who could not manage effectively, on the other hand, in case of a low gap, elites can manipulate some promises for closing these gaps.

Another problem is civic engagement and economic inequality. In addressing these questions, we must look the relationship between income inequality and civic engagement, Levin-Waldman (2013) points out that individuals in households with different levels of income had different levels of civic engagement. On an individual level, economic inequality might have a pernicious effect on equal participation of citizens in government and policy-making processes, therefore elites, business companies, and media bosses have better opportunities to have political mobilization (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992).



CHAPTER 2: HUNGARY

2.1 POPULISM IN HUNGARY

Unlike the rest of the world, the common discourse of the right-wing populist parties that are on the rise in Europe is shaped by anti-immigration. There is a populism shaped through the alienation concept. European citizens fear that immigrants who left their countries due to the civil war by coming to Europe will capture their jobs, therefore, they act out of fear that it will take their welfare away from them. At this point, the fear that welfare will decline is politicized and becomes the main campaign topic of the populist parties in the elections. The most important feature for the *Fidesz* party led by Viktor *Orbán* in Hungary was that they emphasized the anti-immigrant rhetoric by appealing to the panic and anxiety of the voters in their campaigns.

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In Hungary, Viktor *Orbán* has been named as a pioneer among populist leaders, especially with the rhetoric he used during the election campaign in all elections, and it is one of the typical features of populism. *Orbán* accused immigrants as an enemy figure by using us/other distinctions. *Orbán* also has described migration as an "invasion" and migrants as a 'poison' (Deutsch Welle, 2018). *Fidesz* always emphasizes Hungary is under external and internal that mostly showed communists and socialists, it started to spread the fear of foreigners and immigrants to the Hungarian people. The Hungarian people made anti-immigrant propaganda with posters that read "STOP" (Infomigrants, 2021). Moreover, the *Orbán* government gave the order to start the fence work on the

Serbian border with the help of military forces to prevent illegal immigration (Euronews, 2017). In September of 2015, *Orbán*, who met with EU officials in Brussels in April, continued his anti-immigrant stance. Thousands of refugees, many of whom were Syrians migrate to Europe. He reiterated his view that he saw it as a threat to his Christian identity and told these refugees should stay in Turkey (Euronews, 2015). *Orbán*, who defines immigration as the "Trojan horse of terror" and associates it with crime, terrorism, and anti-Semitism, said that immigrants, the majority of whom are Muslims, pose a great threat to Europe's Christian values and that defense expenditures for this are a great threat. It has also made statements about the necessity of developing a European army and even establishing a European army (The Guardian, 2017). The Hungarian government, which also puts pressure on non-governmental organizations that work for immigrants and carry out both monitoring and aid activities, has subjected the work of these organizations to the special permission of the ministry of interior and announced that a 25 percent tax will be applied to external funds (Reuters, 2018).

As Jan Werner Muller calls moralized anti-pluralism as a core element of populism, in Hungary we see that *Orbán* has constructed its populist rhetoric on anti-pluralism. We see a lot of anti-pluralistic policies in Hungary. *Orbán* government limits freedom of speech and media pluralism, therefore, the government undermined rule of law (Bánkuti, 2012). Populism in Hungary is not shaped by only immigration but is also by minority groups. The populist leaders promise to show solutions, but, above all, clearly identifies the enemies (Albertazzi and McDonnel, 2008). The feeling of anger against Jews, chips, and communists in Hungary has intensified lately (Becker, 2010). At this point, we see that ethnic polarization has a profound impact on Hungary. Polarization makes Hungary a suitable country for populism. Especially in past, the political leader Janos Kadar transformed the Stalinist slogan 'those who are not with us are against us' into 'those who are not against us are with us' (Andor, 2000). This contributed a lot to the behavior of dividing the Hungarian people into two groups on any controversial topic after the 2000s. We see a general shift a civilizational threat from Islam and has given rise to identitarian "Christianism" that consists of core European elements such as reason in the West (Brubaker, 2017).

Economic downturns had devastating effects, especially for the Hungarian people. Despite being a member of the EU in the last period, the resolution of economic problems

resulted in a decrease in confidence in the EU and its institutions. During this period, *Orbán's* illiberal democracy became very popular. Swank and Betz (2003) examine different populist parties in Eastern Europe and find out that they aim to reach the welfare state and promise broad social protection that they put their party position in favor of xenophobia, anti-establishment rhetoric, and neoliberal policies. We see that there is a change in the understanding of the economic welfare state of the recent populist leaders. The concept of the Welfare state is now combined with nationalism. Therefore, expansionist, ethno-exclusionary welfare state understanding is dominant in new populist leaders like Trump, Le Pen, and Urban (Lendvai-Bainton and Szelewa, 2020). *Orbán's* continued election success in Hungary shows that this nationalist and authoritarian neoliberalism has an electoral response and voters support it. There are some reasons for that, *Orbán* has offered a plan beyond the usual liberal prescription in the country that stuck between unemployment and economic crisis, always tried to persuade these policies with a nationalist tone. Moreover, *Fidesz* was successful in terms of economic development, for example, Hungary was the first to receive a €20 billion emergency loan from the IMF and the EU that *Orbán* was successful repay earlier than planned (Euractiv, 2013). As Bugaric and Kuhelj (2018) claim that *Orbán* can directly challenge liberal democracy and the economic market, unlike other populists. In a speech, *Orbán* openly states that liberal democracy is over, and we must replace it with 21st-century Christian democracy that guarantees people's freedom and security (DeutschWelle, 2018).

Moreover, media has contributed to populist discourse that shows mainly crime or immigration news that dominates the public debate (Walgrave and de Swert, 2004). According to studies of Szabó, Norocel, and Bene (2019), media controlled by populist leaders has much more impact in the public sphere and has a chance to influence public opinion. When we look at *Orbán's* media expansionism toward Eastern Europe, we see that these strategies also contributed to the illiberal rhetoric of *Fidesz* in different countries.

2.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN HUNGARY

In competitive regimes, incumbents seek to maximize their capacities to stay in office longer. For this reason, they are continuously changing the rule of games in favor of themselves. Accordingly, *Fidesz* and *Orbán* made changes to the constitution and laws to remove or weaken important check and balance institutions. In the elections held in two rounds on 11-24 April 2010, the *Fidesz*-KDNP alliance won 263 seats in the 386-seat parliament. With this result, *Fidesz* came to power after eight years, and Viktor *Orbán* has become prime minister for the second time. *Fidesz*, which obtained 68 percent of the seats in Parliament, made important changes in the constitution such as limiting power of Constitutional Court and media, with the absolute majority is achieved (The New York Times, 2011). The new Constitution was adopted in 2011 has entered into force as of January 1, 2012. The constitutional amendment has brought many discussions. With an absolute majority, the political power, which reached a two-thirds majority in Parliament and provided the necessary number for constitutional amendments, narrowed the powers of the Constitutional Court with a constitutional amendment. In the original proposal, the budget law, social security law, and tax laws were foreseen to be excluded from the supervision of the Constitutional Court. The final version of the Constitutional amendment, which was adopted a month later, did not take these laws out of the higher court supervision but reduced the scope of its control. Thus, the powers of the Constitutional Court were reduced. The number of judges has been increased from 11 to 15 and their term has been increased from 9 years to 12 years. The authority to elect the President of the Court was taken from the Court and given to the Parliament. Another controversial debate on while the law limits the powers of the Constitutional Court on budget and tax issues, it empowers the President to dissolve the Parliament if the budget is not approved by April. The restriction on the powers of the Constitutional Court loses its validity only if the public debt falls below 50 percent of the gross domestic product. This rate is around 80 percent now. According to experts, the main problem in the new Constitution is that it grants the ruling party the power to control basic public institutions such as the Financial Council, which undertakes budget control.

Other important changes have occurred with election law that contains two important changes. One of them is that the new law applies the principle of “winner-

takes-all”, that is, it gives more votes to Fidesz, the possibility of an overwhelming majority in parliament. According to the second criticism of the law, the new electoral law completely changes the electoral districts that have been implemented until now, it disintegrates the regions where the opposition is strong and reduces the opposition's chances of winning by combining with other regions.

Another important battle was the control of the central bank. Fidesz makes some changes to the charter of the Central Bank and captures the authority to appoint the head of the central bank. After the bill passed in the assembly, *Viktor Orbán* has appointed György Matolcsy, who was minister of *Orbán*, and claims that he gives economy to "true hands" (DW, 2011).

In democracies, certain laws should be protected and require supermajority conditions to protect minority groups or fundamental rights of citizens. As a result of this changes of these cardinal laws, which require a two-thirds majority, are seen as guarantees of freedoms and rights that changes in these laws have not been welcome. In Hungary, Fidesz makes some of the most important changes in these laws and this is perceived as a threat against democracy because if Fidesz loses elections they can maintain their power through counter-majoritarian institutions that they have designed (Bogaards, 2018). With these constitutional changes, Fidesz has reached an unlimited power that can surpass opponents' moves easily (Schleppe, 2015).

It should be noted that Hungary is a unique case for theories of political organizations. Let's start with the theory that the presidential system and powerful presidents that as Linz claims that presidential systems are prone to collapse and can cause democratic backsliding. This theory fails to explain the democratic decline in Hungary. Because if we ignore the short periods, Hungary has a long tradition of parliamentary systems. It is a country that has never experienced the harmful effects of the presidential system. On the contrary, Hungary's democratic decline happened under the parliamentary system. Moreover, this democratic decline was rapid and sudden (Bogaards, 2018). It is not in a historical legacy, because Hungary has had a healthy democratic experience since 1990 and has made reforms faster than other countries in European Union. In addition, the transition period has been smooth than was expected.

According to Reynold's inclusive electoral institution's ideas that this hypothesis states institutional design and electoral system is crucial in maintaining political stability and appease political conflict between ethnic and ideological differences. Particularly, electoral systems based on proportional representation can lead to the creation of other inclusive institutions. Otherwise, majoritarian institutions can be manipulated easily by incumbents for consolidating power. This hypothesis can fit the unique and mixed Hungarian electoral system. In the democratization period, the political system was based on the consensus of traditional political parties such as socialists and smallholders. All these parties favored different political systems, and in the end, they agreed upon a mixed electoral system that based on three classes of seats, in which 176 seats were allocated according to majoritarian principle and single-member-district, 146 seats were elected through proportional representation with regional party list and rest of seats was given based on the national list. Regional and national lists promote political representation to some extent (Koresenyi, 1999). Moreover, Hungary enjoys quite a homogenous society. However, the electoral system favored larger parties by expanded the voting rate and give more seats based on the national and regional list. For example, in the 2010 elections Fidesz win a 53 percent vote and translated 68 percent that is supermajority in National Assembly. In other words, this system was designed for proportionality, but it is closer to a majoritarian system. By giving so much power and authority to the winning side, it provides auspicious maneuver space for incumbents to expand their executive powers. In addition, thresholds have constraints entering small parties and give a huge advantage to electoral wins irrefutably. Considering these impacts, we can conclude that the majoritarian nature of the Hungarian elections system can trigger democratic backsliding.

According to Mainwaring's party system fractionalization's ideas that this hypothesis points out that high levels of party-system fractionalization can harmful political stability because many parties compete in elections can lead to political turbulence and trigger de-democratization. However, the Hungarian electoral system is designed to leave small parties out, because both these parties should overcome the threshold, in which approximately 5 percent for a single party and 10

percent for two alliances, and 15 percent for three alliances. The most important point is political stability, generally, coalitions are seen as prone to political turbulence because coalition parties can end alliances easily. However, while the Hungarian system forces parties to enter in alliances, parties' commitment to alliance consensus and maintain process end of elections. To be more specific, elections are held regularly, and parties do not leave from alliances easily. For these reasons, we cannot claim any political stability generating from a multi-party system.

When we focus on Seawright's party-system collapse theories that this hypothesis also claims that sometimes traditional parties collapse because of could not respond to economic and political crises and citizens seek an outsider to save the situation and this creates a vacuum effect in favor of anti-establishment parties. Therefore, traditional parties start to disappear and replace populist parties. When we look at historical process, we see that after the democratic transition after 1990, party fractionalization and electoral system design for cartel party system and a consensus democracy were established on strong party fraction to maintain the interest of new and old elites. However, regulations for party structures allow them to avoid transparency that public mistrust has gradually increased and provide an opportunity for anti-establishment parties to rise such as Fidesz and Jobbik (Ilonszki and Várnagy, 2014). Moreover, we see a balance between socialists and conservatives in elections. Balance always prevents incumbents from acting improperly because a few vote shifts can overthrow the government in next election. More importantly. Due to the close vote rate, most probably each side will have an approximately similar number of representatives, which means that incumbents should take care of different advice and opinions representatives who can change the side that pushes the ruling party to be a minority. After these explanations, a quick reflection on a typical day will reveal how the historical process of electoral competition has evolved. After 1990, surveys show that Hungarians are in favor of the protective state and right-wing parties, in which conservative MDF gain 23 percent of total votes and become the first party, come to power with numbers. However, the potential of Socialists is approximately 26 percent (Barnabas, 2000). After the 1990 elections, socialists have launched a

Congress that taken radical decisions. Election results demonstrate that voters show no interest in current party ideology, and they have decided to separate their ties and conception of politics from old HSWP and take social-economic policies at the center (Barnabas, 2020). Due to re-regulations in the inner system party and strong hierarchical structure mixed with organizational power make Socialists as a counterbalance of the conservative wing (Barnabas, 1993). After these developments, HSP has become the first party in the 1994 elections and reached 32 percent of the total votes. After these elections, we see a balance between conservatives and socialists till 1998s. During these years, most people have begun to see reasons for declining living standards because of the wrong policies of ruling elites (Barnabas, 2000). Under such a political environment, small parties catch an opportunity to rise and Fidesz come to power in the 2000 elections. However, the total collapse of Socialists has started with this election, and discontent of voters toward Socialists gradually increased and the party could not get back its potential in the next elections. Voters have shifted to right parties such as the rise of Jobbik and balance lasted till 2010 has been collapsed. Jobbik is one of the extremist parties in Hungary and it has increased its votes after the decline of the Socialists bloc. After these explanations, we can say that collapse of the traditional socialist party contributes to the rise of extremist right-wing parties such as Jobbik. Consequently, we can say that trust in traditional parties has thawed out in the course of time, and voter's preferences shift to mostly right-wing parties, and this breaks the balance between left and right parties that started from the 1990s.

According to Le-Bas, Lust, and Waldner's unbalanced party system and dominant-party system theories that hypothesis suggests that in a dominant-party system, leaders of strong parties can produce anti-democratic policies because of no threat coming from weaker parties. However, we cannot apply these ideas to the Hungarian case because traditional Hungarian parties have a long history and strong party organizations. Especially recent developments refute this theory in Hungary, six opposition parties joined forces against the longest-serving Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The parties gathered under one roof announced that they will participate in the race with a single candidate to defeat the government in the elections to be held in 2022. In the statement made by the parties that decided to act

jointly, it was stated that the cooperation was not a merger, but they set aside their differences of opinion for change (Euronews, 2020). As we emphasize above, Fidesz and Orbán change the system for their favor and not leave any option to the opponents than joining together, and as you know in democracies far-reaching coalitions can be fragile because of all ideological parties should convince their voters to move together with rival ideological parties. Consequently, this theory fails to explain backsliding in Hungary.

To sum up, the design of the political institutes in Hungary was designed with a pluralistic understanding. Despite this illiberal design, the Hungarian democracy developed rapidly over time and became an exemplary country in terms of democracy. Although there are data suitable for some theories on this subject, it would be a more appropriate interpretation to say that a problem arising from a systemic problem caused Fidesz to increase its power and area of influence, rather than saying that it caused democratic backsliding. Moreover, Fidesz continues to change the political institutions and models in his favor. But they are trying to use this power as a tool.

2.3 POLARIZATION IN HUNGARY

2.3.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLARIZATION IN HUNGARY

Polarization is seen one of the most important democratic backsliding causes in literature. Not only in Hungary but also all the post-Soviet states suffer such problems. After the collapse of Communism, Post-Communist states suffer from a transient to market-oriented economy. During this period, radical economic reforms have a pernicious impact on Hungarian society, lower income, poor public services, and reduction of social benefit have affected most of the society. To put it another way, this transformation has resulted in economic inequality and poverty.

Polarization has old roots in Hungary and has mostly been shaped by the right-left divide. According to the party polarization index was prepared by Dalton (2008) Hungary is the most polarized country in Europe after Cyprus and its rate is immediately increasing. When we examine the nature of polarization in Hungary,

we see interesting outcomes that polarization is not based on policy-based but ideological differences (Enyedi, 2016). Most thinkers strongly emphasize that the most important cleavages of Hungarian society are cultural factors (Palonen, 2009). Why did sociocultural divergences emerge in Hungarian society? When we glimpse the short history of Hungary, we see that these divergences have been embedded in center-periphery relations. Before the communist's period, Hungarians have undergone some of the most important events that shaped the mindset of Hungarians such as relations with Austria and independent wars, then two world wars, and recently communist experience. All these events contribute cultural divergence of society. One cleavage has been shaped under religion and secularism and the other has become class divergences (Kosenyi, 1999). Party campaigns and policies have been established on both two tectonic plates. The right-left division has been developed electoral discourse in these terms. Enyedi (2016) defines this use of discourse as populist polarization in which depicts the political area as a struggle of good and evil who are mostly corrupt elites. Let's look at the main fault lines in Hungary.

2.3.2 DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION

During the 1990s, the Hungarian political spectrum consisted of socialists, liberals, and Christian nationalists (Kosenyi, 1999). In terms of religious values, nationalists and socialists have been on two opposite sides of the spectrum and in terms of communism, liberals and socialists have been sided on the same positions (Enyedi, 2006). After the 1990 elections, MDF has won and preferred allying with FKGP and KDNP to form a traditionalists coalition based on religious-cultural divergences rather than allying with Fidesz that show strong support for pro-market policies (Vegenyi, 2018). But, when we come to the 1994 elections, everything has been upside down. The first crisis has begun emerging in economic realms after the Communist regime. Transition to a liberal market will be painful and this is the first challenge before a conservative coalition. Average wages and accession to public service get into trouble. A regression has reduced one-third of GDP and social inequality rises at an unprecedented scale. De-industrialization has caused people

to lose their job. Inflation has reached 22 percent and unemployment 13 percent. Most of the factory shut down that it means 800.000 unemployed people. Life standards decreased swiftly, and the conservative government fails to manage the transition to the free market and after painful liberal policies, public demand rise for social security that comes from the communist regime. More importantly, the government did not see any considerable international aid from western powers. All these costs should be paid by one part of society. Economic hardship and the death of popular Prime Minister Jozsef Antall turned to total defeat for the conservative coalition in the 1994 elections.

The victory of socialist MSZP has divide liberals into two groups in 1994. While SZDSZ has been part of the coalition, Fidesz has rejected to joint government and some of the most liberal figures left from the party. This election makes Fidesz more conservative because they see a weakness in the right-wing and evaluate an opportunity to fill (Bakke, 2010). Loss of the conservative bloc provide a space for the Fidesz and they adopted more conservative discourse (Kosenyi, 1999). Moreover, Orbán has decided to become a catch-all party and take a leading role in the center-right (Lomax, 1999). These discourses especially have been shaped by pro-state economic policies (Enyedi, 2006). Fidesz is rewarded for its effort in the 1998 election and comes to power. With this election, parties see that nationalistic rhetoric begin working in Hungarian elections. Especially socialists change and take a more aggressive campaign and blame opponents to borrow foreign debt. While there is no important indicator that party policies have been polarized harshly, during these terms, it is observed that all parties have a shift to a more conservative line even MSZP shows similar signs (Vegetti, 2014).

After the 2002 elections, with losing of elections for Fidesz will open the polarization door and blame election fraud for MSZP and tried to delegitimize state under Socialists (Muller,2011). After that, Fidesz has started a new political project is called the “Civic Circle Movement” that aims to transform civil society and campaign for mass membership activities. Moreover, Orbán has invited everyone to join in this movement is a true representative of Hungarians that depict government as if opponents (Greskovits, 2020). As events become nationwide, discourse used in events has been more populist that distinguishes corrupt elites and

people (Palenon, 2009). After that, parties consistently have questioned the opponent's legitimacy and commitment to national values. Especially Koresenyi (1999) argues that commitment to democracy and nation have been the main discourse that differs blocs. Particularly one event trigger more polarized Hungarian politics; Ferenc Gyurcsány's voice record leak that says, "we lied to win the election" and trigger a mass demonstration widespread. At this point, Fidesz has used the "civic circle" in an effective way to step down Prime Minister. With resignation demand combined with the 2008 economic crisis led to call help for a rescue package from IMF. Viktor Orbán has blamed Ferenc Gyurcsany for failing to defend national interest and democracy against Russia and International external forces. After a firm campaign, Fidesz has come to power in the 2010 election. A new party is called Jobbik in which more extreme has risen its vote to 16 percent and provide an opportunity that presents an alternative to Fidesz.

2.3.3 THE IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY

The most important cause of political polarization is immobile voters. Recent election shows that voters are becoming more unwilling to change political party preferences (Vegetti, 2018).

Replacement volatility refers to old and new parties and electoral volatility refers to shifting of vote shares. As you see in 2010 has a remarkable year in which the coming of Jobbik must shake the party system and trigger vote shifts. However, after that, we see a stable process that voters did not change their preferences substantially. These kinds of immobilizing situations have a pernicious effect on democracies. When society is divided into two-part as evil and good, costs of changing preferences in favor of other parties have increased dramatically in their own group. Especially, Fidesz has enjoyed this polarization that they always emphasize delegitimate of opponents and expect from voters to ignore their policies that undermine democracy in return for defending national interests.

According to Enyedi (2016), the majoritarian electoral system force parties' polarization that has a pernicious effect on Hungarian democracy that democratic backsliding begins with elite polarization, and the Hungarian party system provides

a background for polarization. Particularly liberals and conservatives are standing on both edges of the spectrum. The antagonism between the two blocs and huge differences in cultural values combined with firm competition has created huge pressure on voters to stick to one side firmly. As a result of this, if one party loses elections, voters feel that they have completely been excluded from not just the government but also from the policy-making process. For these reasons, a loser party always questions a winner's legitimacy. It is a well-known fact that people naturally tend to talk about politics in their daily lives that preferring with those who shares similar political mindset. Voters gradually become more polarized than willing to listen to some news that just confirms its own ideas. This makes more flu line between reality and perception. More biased voters' auspicious environment for disinformation and sided media effect daily politics. In Hungary, several studies have shown that there is a correlation between media consumption habits and political preferences (Gazsó 2005).

Another important development happened within the party. When government parties began using polarized discourse, this harms party structure too. polarization demands more homogenous voices in a party, for this reason, The polyphonic structure within the party breaks down and opponents in a party can be pushed out. This happens in the Fidesz. Some of its members that share liberal values left, including key figures such as Péter Molnár, Gábor Fodor, and Zsuzsanna Szelényi.

To sum up, in Hungary polarization is very high and has a pernicious impact on electoral volatility. When two antagonistic groups occur, people tend to ignore their parties' mistakes and even corruption. loss of government to another side becomes a win-takes-all situation, national identity turns to party identity. In Hungary conservative side is consolidated under Fidesz. and balance between left and right turn to rights' favor. However, recently opponents come from the conservative side are called the Jobbik movement. consequently, polarization is one of the main causes of democratic backsliding in Hungary.

2.4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUNGARY

Hungary has a long history of communist authority, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hungary has undergone a rapid democratization period. Some were more skeptical because of Hungarian revolution failed in 1956, which after Khrushchev has delivered a speech that began de-Stalinization, unrest turned to rebellion to take control of government and Imre Nagy became prime minister, agreeing to establish a multiparty system, However, Western countries are not willing to support this revolution to not trigger a conflict with Soviets. On November 4 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to stop the revolution. This example demonstrates the Western linkage and leverage that Hungarians always feel like a support leg. After the socialist system, political parties have agreed on joining the EU and become the first country in Eastern Europe that adopt political institutions transfer from the EU (Ágh, 1995).

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, PM József Antall, who is first democratically elected from MDF in the 1990 election, emphasize integration with western countries as defining its main objective of foreign policy. The association agreement entered into force in December 1991. However, the EU realizes a threat that post-communist states can be a burden on Union, for his reasons, Copenhagen's criteria aim at the existence of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Criteria included the existence of a stable and institutionalized democracy, the rule of law and the rule of law, respect for human rights, protection of minorities will be evaluated in terms of four main criteria. Generally; the country is governed by a multi-party democratic system, respect for the rule of law, the absence of the death penalty, the absence of any discrimination against minorities, the absence of racial discrimination, the prohibition of any kind of discrimination against women, the fact that it was accepted without reservation with all articles of the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights, features such as the adoption of the Council on the Rights of the Child are taken into account. However, the existence of these principles alone is not enough, they should also be applied continuously. After these criteria were completed properly, finally, Hungary has become a member of the EU.

2.4.1 WHY EU LEVERAGE ON HUNGARY HAS NOT BEEN WORKING?

Recently, the EU's capacity to catapult member states to a more democratic position has declined dramatically. The main question at this point while EU membership was the ultimate goal for Hungary and adopted the most important democratization steps, how Hungary develop resistance against Western leverage?

After the 2008 economic crisis, the EU's authority falls in a brittle position in eyes of EU citizens and countries. Especially EU is questioned in terms of economic recovery projects. The Union fails to deliver its promises for an economic boom and the crisis helps to deepen the division of center-periphery (Enis, Kutlay; 2019). Especially when small countries face economic crises, they tend to accuse the main leading countries of the EU that ignore their own problems (Hall, 2012). In addition, terrorist attacks give huge damage to the security feelings of citizens, and this provides an insecure environment for all EU members. Why could EU not take instrumental decisions to prevent this process? The discords between member states have constraint capability of EU to implement more coercive policies. Under uncertainty, political leadership is perceived as the safest route to prosperity for Hungarians. Moreover, the increasing economic performance of illiberal East countries is seen as a model for other developing countries. Moreover, citizens feel that traditional elites are not able to deal with new global and economic challenges anymore (Mudde, 2015). At this point, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz present illiberal policies as an alternative to liberal democracy. More importantly, citizens began losing their credit toward the EU and its institutions. Recently Eurosceptic feelings have increased among EU citizens. In Hungary, we see that Eurosceptic parties are on the rise such as Fidesz, Jobbik, and Our Homeland Party that whose total share has reached 65.66 percent in National Assembly.

Recently, especially government has raised some of the most aggressive languages to damage the EU's prestige in eyes of the public. Some discourse analysis reveals how the ruling party's discourse has been transformed into a more anti-liberal manner. According to Lazanyi's studies shows that since 2014 anti-EU discourse has risen rapidly and negative rhetoric has been a central point of general EU topics (Danaj, Lazanyi, Nilan, 2018).

Another important point is about a single European currency is called Eurozone. Eurozone based on members sacrifices their own monetary sovereignty that engenders distrust towards the political system, therefore, provide an auspicious environment for the rhetoric of populist parties and cause democracies to backslide (Zingales, 2014). Why Euro has been a discussion point? The Eurozone covers 17 out of 27 EU countries. The costs of its participation arise because it lacks the ability to pursue the independent monetary policies needed to balance internal and external money flow. For example, the problem of Greece's inability to pay its debt has spread to the countries of Ireland, Portugal, moreover, Greece needed a bailout package. Currently, Italy, Spain, and Belgium are considered being at high risk of getting the same disease.

Populist parties have benefited from such a distrust atmosphere toward European institutions, Therefore, Eurosceptic discourse combined with a realistic international environment fosters the rising of populism. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) point out that, Euroscepticism's trace can be seen all over the European Union (EU) countries and some populist parties. As Enyedy shows that that in Hungary, the populism that sauced with Euroscepticism comes to power (Enyedy, 2015). Especially, after the 2010 elections, we see that the two-party system has collapsed, and a new party is called Jobbik has become a game-changer party in the political arena.

As you see, democratic illiberalism is seen as an alternative to the Western liberal ideology. In Hungary, some institutional preconditions tend to provide a favorable environment after the global crisis for thrilling of challenger against EU norms (Enyedy, 2015).

To sum up, European Union has lost its prestige after losing full membership card and governments do not feel any coercion and obligation. This loss of motivation provides an auspicious environment for illiberal turns. Before full membership, the governments in Hungary have struggled to implement liberal changes for public life and the constitution. but after the mission is completed, new targets do not become liberal consolidation. Consequently, we can see a decrease in international pressure on Hungary contributes to declining in democratic values in Hungary.

2.5 CRONY CAPITALISM-COALITIONS IN HUNGARY

Hungary is seen as a hybrid regime recently that we can define while they are competitive in terms of providing democratic opportunities to the opposition, they are not democratic in terms of arranging the competition area disproportionately in favor of the incumbents. The skewed playing field covers three main areas as financial resources, media, and law. The opposition does not have access to financial resources to fund the election campaigns in these regimes, because the government deprives the opposition of these resources with the pressure it exerts on financial circles. Likewise, their access to the media is also extremely limited. In these instances, the media is either completely under the control of the government or has been digested too much to get close to the opposition. For this reason, the opposition cannot explain itself to the public through the media and is marginalized by the dominant media under the control of the government. Another factor that renders the field of competition unequal is the law. Judicial power under government control in hybrid regimes and as a direct result of this there is no judicial control over the executive. Secondly, in these regimes, the judiciary concentrated all its attention on the opposition and put it under pressure. Consequently, the opposition is not able to reach justice and is constantly prosecuted and thus unable to compete fairly with the government (Lewitsky and Wat, 2010).

Orbán passed a new media law as soon as he came to power in 2010. With this regulation, the "National Media and Telecommunications Authority" was established. The Media Council, under the absolute control of Fidesz, naturally ensured that this institution was institutionalized in a pro-Fidesz manner. The institution responsible for frequency distribution does not give frequency to the opposition in its first 18 months, that it did not respond positively to opponents' demands. This institution, which also has the authority to control the media, has also tended to suppress opposition press organizations with penalties. By arrangements also all the public broadcasters were gathered under one roof and subordinated to a newly formed superior institution. This new management, on the

other hand, has been rapidly recruiting and firing 570 employees from state channels and employed party members in their positions. After this change, Hungarian State Television (MTV) has dramatically reduced the time it devotes to the opposition, and news about the ruling coalition has become 83 percent of the total news (Bajomi, 2013).

Fidesz has applied clientelist economy management. The party has also managed to control media organizations. As of 2016, businessmen close to Orbán have captured almost all the media with the loans they received from public banks (Bajomi, 2017). Fidesz also managed to keep their loyalty alive by giving public advertisements to these media outlets (Batorfy and Urban, 2019). Thus, it both made public resources available to its supporters and limited the opposition's access to the media.

According to the World Bank data, Hungary fell to sixty ninth position in the competitive economy ranking. Increasing corruption and declining competitiveness have been most evident in public tenders. While 9 percent of the public tenders held in the same year were made by invitation, 36 percent were given a single bid (World Bank, 2020). So much so that between 2009-15, it was determined that public tenders were less competitive and transparent, and the invitation procedure was adopted more frequently in tenders. Such irregularities were also seen in the distribution of EU funds within the country, and it was revealed that businessmen close to Fidesz got rich during the whole process (Toth & Hajdu, 2015). For example, Lorinc Meszaros, a close friend of Orbán, bought 4.5 percent of the public tenders between 2010 and 2016. Orbán's control over the economy is so evident that he is in a close relationship with Lajos Simicska took 11 percent of public tenders in 2013, However after the fall out with Orbán, this ratio declined to 0.1 percent in 2015 (Martin, 2017). The fact that Fidesz enriches businessmen that have a good relationship with the party and due to uncompetitive resource allocation mechanisms and in return ensures their loyalty and prevents the development of new successful companies. Fidesz provides some convenience to their own businesspeople, direct assistance, exemption from tax exemptions, credit facilities, and controls. Crony capitalism is therefore not only disrupting the functioning of the market but also reduced competition in the political field and

ensures the continuity of the competitive authoritarian regime (Martin, 2017). Moreover, this harms new entrepreneurship because new companies begin rising, most probably, the government wants to be involved and if you reject, they start to use a check system to disturb your business chains. All of these destroy the competitive liberal market and provide an opportunity to blame liberal values. Moreover, *Orbán* uses these speeches for Bloomberg to blame the liberal market, he says that the "experience of 2008 financial crisis showed that liberal democratic states cannot remain globally competitive”

2.6 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN HUNGARY


A level of income is one of the main indicators of economic survival. Hungary was seen as one of the leading countries in terms of economic transition by Huntington after the 1990s. Stable rates turn down since the 2008 economic crisis and provide the auspicious political environment for the rise of Fidesz. Trust in capitalism has decreased swiftly because of social tensions with the debt crisis in Hungary since 2000. When we look at graphics Hungarian's GDP per capita is relatively high and has a stable increase. As you know, a high-level prosperity is seen a main column of Democratic regimes. For this reason, we have eliminated this kind of theories that based on economic income of citizens as Prezeworski (1997) claimed. Fidesz showed very well economic performance after they come to power in 2010. However, they did this economic performance by following another path rather than following regular capitalist principles. Moreover, with increasing GDP per capita, *Orbán* consolidated its votes that come from the middle and working classes.


According to Istvan Lovas who is close to Viktor *Orbán*, people feel that their living standards have been raised and economic indicators affirm that. If we look at statistically, indicators reflect a positive development. Government debt has decreased gradually, and GDP has increased better than average of OECD countries. The budget deficit has decreased and keeps stability. As a result of this business and financial services companies such as Moody's and Fitch rate Hungary as having good standards for investment. Wages have increased by more than 12

percent. Deprivation tends to fall and lastly, unemployment has dropped considerably.

As Scheiring (2018) points out that voters do not want their own governments to harm democratic institutions, however, this can be possible if elites see their future and interest in other alternative systems. At this point, we see a polarized elite in capitalist class.

Another important point is about Fidesz attacks international organizations such as IMF and World Bank to show them as public enemies. Fidesz's campaign focuses on external enemies that included global investors such as George Soros and the threat of migration. It means that Fidesz presents itself as an alternative for Hungarians that are afraid of losses of their jobs to immigrants. Under these conditions, government sing the praises of 'domestic and national' investments. In other words, domestic elites and their companies' values increased in eyes of public that help both legitimate public contracts and get less reaction from voters. Unfortunately, oligarchical concentrations of economic power are seen in Hungary (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018).





Source: Word Bank Hungary Overview Data

CHAPTER 3: TURKEY

3.1 POPULISM IN TURKEY

Turkey is a country that has experienced many different aspects of political life in many ways. Populism, one of them, has a very ancient history in Turkey. In this section, we will try to reveal its relationship with democracy by tracing the bulwarks of Turkey's populist past.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, different identities were denied, and the society is seen as a community without social classes and ethnic differences. At this point, Karpas (1959) discusses that especially political parties changed their policy of class representation to general representation. The idea that to be a representative of all social groups. There is no political party based on class representation during the emergence of the new Republic. After the rapid urbanization, slum-squatting “*gecekondulaşma*” spread all over the cities, and home prices rise rapidly. At this point, we see that a new paradigm and new mass begin to exist in urban areas and the Democrat party should also consider the demands of these mass, and we see that these masses become a political actor, not

a viewer any longer. From this point, Boratav (1998) argues that political parties would now have to take account of a new group and respond to the social and economic demands of different groups of people. However, class differences have increased after this period because of unbalanced national income equality. These different classes will be shaped Turkish politics from this time by defining and identifying themselves. Serif Mardin (1973) explains the main dynamics of Turkish politics with the center-periphery relationship. At this point, he talks about the relationship between the ruling groups that hold the power, namely the bureaucracy, military, and intellectual groups, and the traditional groups that are more dismissed from the center. It can also be read as a struggle between the secular minority and the conservative majority. At this point Heper (1985) claimed that a transcendental state administration (transcendentalism) was inherited from the Ottoman Empire, that is, an understanding that the state can intervene in every aspect of life by the bureaucratic elites. In other words, society is seen as an object that needs to be educated and transformed. And these ideas show struggle between society and bureaucratic elites. This was reflected in the first political life with the establishment of the Democratic party. Because many concepts have been brought to this political period with the effort of DP. Therefore, the strongest one of them is the concept of “national will”. As a result of this, obtaining the most votes were the reason for political legitimacy. Thus, the public has become the most important factor in political life. But the concept of people has been found with a nationalist sauce. The nationalist vessel will feed the populist vessel for a long time.

Turkish political life has recently witnessed the adoption of the concept of 'national will' by almost all political actors. Political actors use the concept of national will to legitimize their actions or weaken other political actors. However, since the proclamation of the Republic, the national will concept, which forms the basis of populist politics, has been a concept that is used only by one side of the political spectrum and more strategically. In other words, populism is often used to displace the established order. For example, the Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elite, who founded the new Turkish State based on national sovereignty, introduced the concept of national will to end the authority of the sultan and secularize the political order. In the 1950s, things were reversed, and this second elite group,

represented by the Democrat Party (DP), came to power in 1950 with the slogan “*Yeter söz milletindir*” (enough, is enough, lets nations speaks).

The claim to be the representative of the national will that started with this slogan will be used until our day. The Democratic party had succeeded in positioning itself in the public. The Kemalist elites have always been accused of failing to reach the demands of the people. In contrast, the right conservatives presented themselves as most of the people.

After 2002, JDP come to power and has started with pro-liberal and pro-western policies to not take reaction from Kemalist elites. However, the 2007 Presidential elections turn into institutional crises, the headscarf of the wife of Abdullah Gül was criticized by pro-Kemalist media and the military has published a memorandum is known as “e-coup”, *Erdogan* has used these critiques to mobilize its voters using by anti-establishment discourse. Therefore, JDP always increased its votes in elections and show its popular legitimation to elite groups.

Over time, while JDP has maintained anti-establishment discourse, they realize that they start to stay away from people. Sawae (2020) argues that *Erdogan* does not change his style to respond, however, he changes some members of the party by saying that they are exhausted and dysfunctional at the grassroots. However, JDP begins to lose support, *Erdogan* strongly warns members against the isolation of JDP from the street and masses. And Sawae focuses on the psychological aspect of the demand side as masses are very suitable feelings in Turkey. Because Turkish citizens are inclined to be angry confused quickly during national events such as terrorist attacks and humanitarian disasters. Moreover, *Erdogan* can use politics of belonging very well, *Erdogan* used an inclusive approach for his interest until 2003. Firstly, JDP emphasizes minority problems such as Kurds and Alevis that seem taboos in Turkish society first time. JDP was seen as representative of these groups against the tutelary establishment. However, after 2003, they adopt an exclusive approach.

3.1.2 IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY

Populist discourse has been used by Turkish politics for many years as a tool to claim that they will receive “True people’s” demands terms of politically and economically. However, we see that recently this discourse switch into a more aggressive way that aims to delegitimize political opponents. After JDP come to power in 2002 always emphasized ‘elite’ vs ‘people’ discourse that aims to a war environment between institutions managed by Kemalist elites and JDP that is demonstrated as the true representative of people. Unlike the *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party, ANAP) and *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party, DYP), JDP claimed to be a true representative of oppressed groups and carry their values to power (Kaya, 2015). And this has created a conflict between political institutions and JDP for whom will control these institutions. This war atmosphere was reflected to people in Turkey in a very effective way.

Moreover, elites give the floor a little bit of this image at their every move against JDP. Particularly, issues such as the headscarf, which the public is sensitive about, have become a subject of constant debate. In this environment, while the JDP carried out EU reforms, it was gaining the support and acclaim of the Western countries. This especially prevented the elite from getting enough pressure on them. We see all these developments in the 2010 Turkey report that Rapporteur Ria Oomen-Ruijten said:

I would like to commend Turkish citizens and civil society for their support for further democratization and their commitment to an open and pluralistic society. At the same time, I very much regret the confrontational political climate between the political parties and the strained relations between key political institutions.

As you see in Turkey, unlike other parties in Turkey, JDP has used the support of the EU and increasingly voters against elites in a different way than our elections and referendums as a legitimate tool for their action. By doing this, JDP created a perception that people began viewing that election boxes are macro courts, and the public is judges. When a check and balance system begin functioning against JDP, they go to elections or referendum to fresh their power and gain legitimacy to change these systems. The first referendum was held to elect the presidential election in parliament was went into deadlock in 2007. Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the JDP, received 357 votes, and debates on majority number trigger secularism

debates. The same day, the General Military Staff made a statement with an emphasis on secularism, later called the e-memorandum and this has created an opportunity for JDP to criticize elites against 'people'. Moreover, when President Ahmed Necdet Sezer used veto right, this makes JDP organize more populist discourse that they said people will answer on election day and nobody can prevent national will (NTV, 2011). Before the 2007 constitutional referendum, the early general election took place and NMP re-entered parliament with 14.3 percent of the vote and 71 MPs and it would participate in the Presidential election. Abdullah Gül has become Turkey's eleventh President in the presidential election in August. The constitutional amendment proposal of the JDP, which envisages the election of the President by the people, went to the public on 21 October 2007. In the referendum, 68.9 percent of the votes were "Yes".

The Head of the state cannot be the representative of a political party but is elected as an independent of a coalition of political forces and because of that high vote, the rate was necessary for Parliament, however, as each populist leader is based on populist votes to change fundamental systems. JDP aims to overcome these obstacles and give a message to military elites by holding a referendum that bypasses institutional checks systems. When we come to the 2010 constitution election, we see a new clash between JDP and judiciary and military elites. JDP also identified RPP with "judiciary and bureaucratic power". The RPP accused the JDP of "making a plan to take the judiciary under full control with the new Constitution". For example, according to Hatem Ete who worked in pro-government think tank that draw a conclusion on why we favor for yes in this referendum:

The package is a serious attempt at removing the virtual immunity enjoyed by the military and civilian bureaucracy in Turkey. Aiming to diversify the membership cadres of the High Judiciary by opening it up to more societal and political participation.

However, changes in the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors were applied to change the structure of the high judiciary and reduced the check system of the Turkish Judiciary by appointing in a strategic position from government. *Erdoğan* has used each opportunity that if he needs to ask 'people to vote against elites. On

the other hand, political opponents usually bring contribution to the JDP's populist discourse.

In 2008. The closure trial of JDP and ban its 71 members were failed only one vote and this created favorable conditions for JDP to ask 'people to vote against elites. This combined with the economic boom after 2002 and legitimacy in JDP has reached to peak point. With investigation is called '*Ergenekon*' and '*Balyoz*' help feeding this populist rhetoric. 'Enemy of nation' image on military staff was reinforced by media propaganda that it is claimed these people will bomb mosques for increasing distrust and political stability. At this process, *Erdoğan* applied an active political process that he said that prosecutor exists on behalf of the nation, and we are to seek the right on behalf of the nation, so I am prosecutor of Ergenekon case." *Erdoğan* is very successful to launch these populist campaigns and bring election as death war for voters. During this war atmosphere created by JDP, Dinçşahin (2012) claims that investigations were not used to establish political control over the elites but "anti-JDP groups developed a fear of being associated with one of the junta investigations." This fear has spread all over opponent groups that preferred keep silence. Moreover, JDP has adopted a polarized discourse at each election that resembling George Bush's approach of either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. JDP Group Deputy Chairman Mahir Ünal delivers a speech that, "NMP, RPP, PDP, ISIS, PKK, media, external capitals all attack *Erdoğan*." These kinds of rhetoric always are used by supporters of JDP. At each institutional crisis or debate, JDP seeks to polarize society into two antagonistic groups to take advantage of these debates (Dinçşahin, 2012).

After the 2016 coup d'état was attempted by "Fetullahist Terrorist Organization" is called *FETÖ* to overthrow the legitimate JDP government, populist discourses and authoritarian discourse were launched more intensively. Even George Soros, who support JDP in the first place, turned to become an external threat against our national existence. With these coup attempts, Turkey comes to a new road in political life entirely. JDP and NMP have forged an alliance is called *Cumhur İttifak* and went to a new referendum to remove parliamentary democracy with presidential to increase its authority. Let's examine the campaign discourse of JDP. A referendum was held under economic turbulence that The

Turkish lira lost nearly 12 percent against the US Dollar within one day hitting an all-time low of 6.30 till this days and external powers have become the main topics of a campaign of JDP that is perceived this referendum as survival issue of country that is called "*beka meselesi*". *Erdoğan* has used the same discourse again. The main topic here is will voters give these authorities to him or not, however, *Cumhur* alliance always talks about external powers and delegitimate opponents by claiming they are in association with terror groups. For example, *Erdoğan* said that "We will determine our future on the 24th of the month, you give authority to this brother, then you will see how to deal with interests and interest lobbies" (T24, 2018).

Delegitimate opponent's existence is a method to deep polarization within society. By doing that, you increase the cost of vote shift for voters. JDP and pro-government media always manipulate as if RPP, PDP, and PKK have a relationship and secret alliance under surface. Especially conservative groups are sensitive on this topic. We see the results of this propaganda in the attack against Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is the leader of RPP, that he was attacked by a group at the funeral of the soldier is named Yener Kırıkcı, who lost his life in the clash with the PKK, in the Ankara's Çubuk district. This is a compelling example of how this to delegitimate propaganda is applied effectively. *Erdoğan* never hesitates to associate political opponents with terrorist organizations. In recent speeches on Bogazici University, *Erdoğan* said that Canan Kaftancıoglu is a militant of terrorist DHKPC/C (DeutschWelle, 2021).

Another important dimension of populism in Turkey is the importance of referendums. After 2002 JDP bring some of the most important constitutional amendments packages. These campaigns generally focus on the legitimization of JDP against elitist powers and the concentration of power of the party. The first change is about the head of the state that we mentioned above. The second referendum has held in 2010. The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors are restructured, individual applications to the Constitutional Court are allowed, the quorum for decisions to dissolve political parties and deprivation of state aid is increased, some changes regarding the military judiciary and the temporary article 15, which prevented the prosecution of the September 12 coup plotters, was abolished. During the campaign, JDP has used

‘not enough but yes’ that emphasize the necessity of further reforms. As you see JDP never hesitates to bring anti-elitist amendments before the public. This is one of the most important populist tactics that JDP uses recently. And after 2020, JDP has announced that they prepare a new and much more comprehensive constitution. JDP and NMP do not have a majority for a constitutional amendment. However, in the future, it is stated that the constitutional amendment will be submitted to a referendum under all circumstances if a consensus is reached with the opposition parties and a sufficient majority is achieved. In this way, it is stated that it will be accepted with the widest support and the discussion of its legitimacy will be prevented.

To sum up, populism has a great impact on polarization in Turkey, and both right and left populism is constantly used by politicians in Turkey, which already has deep ideological divisions. Discourses based on marginalization and de-legitimation often come to the fore.

3.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN TURKEY

Political institutionalism is seen by thinkers as an important mechanism to provide democratization. having a healthy check and balance system is a barrier to power abuse. When we focus on political institutions in Turkey, we see a long democratization period started from the Ottoman Empire. Let's examine these processes carefully.

Turkey has a long parliamentary history that its traces go back to the Ottoman period. In 1839, Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa announced an imperial edict is called *Tanzimat Fermanı* (reorganization) and a new reform era has begun in Ottoman Empire. According to Seyitdanoğlu (1999), the edict is semi-constitutional documents and gives a guarantee on fundamental rights. With these reforms, a new assembly is called *Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkâm-ı Adliye* was established, and its duty is a kind of advisory council. In 1908, Sultan Abdulaziz announced *irâde-i seniyye* that established *Şura-i devlet* which the principle of separation of power is mentioned for the first time (Inalcik and Seyitdanoglu, 2006). The first Turkish assembly elected by citizen's votes is called *Meclis-i Mebusan* has been established

in 1877. Despite interruptions under Abdulhamit II, At the end of the Abdulhamid II period, on July 23, 1908, II. Parliamentary elections were held in November and December of the same year with the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy. In the elections in which *Ahrar Party* (Freedomists Party) and *İttihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress Party) participated, the Committee of Union and Progress gained the majority, and the 3rd Parliament was opened on 4 December 1908. This parliament, because of the 31 March Case and Abdulhamid's abdication, made changes to the Constitution in May 1909, narrowing the powers of the sultan and the Elite Council, therefore they increased the assembly's powers. As you see, in Turkey parties, elections and parliamentary culture have a long history. For this long-traditions, Lins's (1990) ideas on presidential are more prone to democratic backsliding cannot fit Turkey case.

After the establishment of modern Turkey, the founder of the Republic Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk has established Republican People's Party in 1923. Progressive Republican Party is named *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, the first opposition party in the history of the Republic of Turkey. It was founded on 17 November 1924 under the leadership of Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat Paşa, Refet Paşa, and Adnan Bey, who were the old close friends of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. However, after the Seyh Said uprising, the party was associated with the uprising and closed in 1925. Later, Liberal Republican Party is called *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* was established in 1930, but some events such as Eskişehir events bring the party to end. We see that bureaucratic elites see the new party as a resource and organized anti-secularist movements seek to become dominant (Kocak, 2006). At this point, we see how bureaucratic elites began to play the protector role of the country and soon military elites will take over this role from them. With the establishment of the *Milli Kalkınma Partisi* (National Development Party) in 1945 and the Democrat party in 1946, Turkey has taken leave from the one-party system. However, closing parties have left a trace on Turkish Democracy that still closing of a party is one of the options on government's desks.

At this point, we can focus on Seawright's (2012) party system collapse theories. In Turkey, parties have established long-term ideologies because of this a continuity continued irrespective of closure trials. Parties' continuum has lasted

more than forty years such as the National vision movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*) and National Movement Party. Despite some traditional parties collapse after 2002 such as the True Path Party and Motherland party, the main parties that carry ideological thought continue till now. We can say that Seawright's theories cannot fit for Turkish case.

According to LeBas (2011) dominant parties can take advantage because of weaker parties. This theory also failed in explaining reasons of democratic backsliding in Turkey. When we look at the party structures, in Turkey, two important factors have become apparent that Turkish political system has an electoral volatility and changing party systems. First, in Turkish politics, political parties are highly centralized and have a hierarchical structure. And second, parties' ideological baggage has a long traditional background. In other words, the politicians in the backbone of the party have joined the party from a young age and are highly experienced in the field of politics. Another phenomenon is that the relations of the parties with each other have spread over a long period of time. Periodically, they shared common things with alliances and coalitions. This brings a common culture. Unlike a situation where there are dominant parties and the opposition does not matter at all, parties in Turkey have had equal power. Although a party dominated the government for a period, we cannot say that the JDP party, Democrat Party and Motherland party reduced the structural features and capacity of other parties to a level that could not be rivaled. There are some reasons for this; first, they did not have to depend on subsidiaries financially. In 1990 and 1992, the political parties continued to enact laws extending the scope of treasury aid. In 1995, the Constitution was amended to ensure the continuity of the aids, and the aids were strengthened. In 2005, with the JDP-RPP cooperation, the scope of aid was narrowed, and the eligibility criteria were raised (Mesut, 2005). At this point, we see that Lustwaldner's theory also fails in explaining backsliding with a comparison based between weak and strong parties. In many countries, political parties are financially dependent on their supporters and members, and this sometimes prevents the parties from acting independently, such as in Japan, but in Turkey, treasury aid allows the parties to maintain their structural strength. The second reason is that the parties are in the position of standard bearers of a

distinctive ideology. Parties in the catch-all style may emerge with a pragmatic understanding and then disappear, especially when there has been a turn towards catch-all parties recently, and while moral concerns and ideology can be ignored for politicians (Heywood, 2013), ideology and identity voters in Turkey still have a great influence on their behavior.

When we look at the Mainwaring's theory that claims multi-party system creates chaos, and these crises prepare a favorable environment for authoritarian parties. Turkey has a lot of coalition experience in history, the longest-running coalition lasted 3,5 years. It means that coalitions in Turkey are relatively short, and this left a negative image on people. In addition, this has been used by pro-government media to corroborate in public. During early periods, a multiparty system could cause political instability and result in military coups. However, we cannot explain democratic backsliding through this theory. Because in Turkey, JDP has become government alone till 2018 when they allied with NMP. We can clearly say that the multi-party system never led to political stability during this period in Turkey.

Finally, we will examine Reynold's inclusive electoral institutions. In the early years of Turkey, the simple majority system was implemented, which led to disproportionate results, for example, despite the Democrat party reached 53 percent in the 1950 elections, the system transforms to 84 percent in the parliament. Although the RPP took 39 percent, this figure fell to 14 percent in the parliament. This electoral system brought a lot of discussions, and it was seen as one of the factors that have a profound impact on democratic backsliding. However, after 1961, the D'Hondt system was implemented, and this brings a more representative environment that in the 1969 election this number reached to 8 parties. After political instability and the military coup, a 10 percent electoral threshold has been implemented and minor parties stayed out of government. Moreover, the system pushes citizens to vote to parties that can enter parliamentary. The electoral system has enabled political stability but sometimes can keep most of society out of the Assembly. Although there is a low possibility, it can happen sometimes, for example, in the 2002 elections, JDP got 34 percent and RPP got 19 percent of the votes. While the other parties remained out of parliament, the JDP was able to

comfortably provide the majority in parliament alone. However, we cannot say this trigger backsliding because more parties enter the assembly since the 2007 elections that after 2017 referendum, an alliance system has been applied and some minor parties catch an opportunity to enter parliament such as Grand Unity Party, Felicity Party, and Democrat party send one representative to Assembly in 2018 elections. Consequently, this theory fails to fit Turkey case.

To sum up, Turkey has a long tradition and history of democracy, even earlier than many countries that are currently shown as the most democratic. However, the constant changes made in terms of the system and the calculations that could not be completed are very intense. However, if we look at the length and life of political and democratic institutions, we see that the effect it will have on democratic backsliding is very limited. After 2002, JDP made changes to increase its own power, but this is a result rather than a reason.

3.3 SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL COALITIONS AND TURKEY

One of the most critical theory is explaining backsliding in Turkey is coalitional theory. Unfortunately, in Turkey, socio-economic policies always become problematic because of approaches of state elite and their actions make Turkish modernization involved with political patronage, and thus there was no effort to develop health economic policies (Heper and Keyman, 1998). Especially after 1980 Turkey's privatization and export-led strategies have begun to apply mostly by Turgut Özal government. However, debt problems of the banking system caused this miracle to end up with untrust in the banking system (Waterburry, 1992). According to Onis (2011), a coalition is created that Allocation of resources between socioeconomic groups led to a complex relationship that gives a guaranteed certain amount of vote and support in terms of media and employment. According to Esen and Gumuscu (2020), the most important reason for backsliding is the coalition between pro-JDP business, JDP party, and urban poor segments of society. Circulation of public procurement, charity, and social services that are provided by the government, in exchange, these benefited groups enabled media

support and votes. JDP has created its own elite class in business life. Now, will focus on how this process happens.

As a first step, large resources were transferred by the government to the conservative media, using the means of state and local governments. Frequency facilities were provided for televisions and radios. RTÜK has provided some facilities and a series of concessions were given. It was the clear capture of the *Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu* (Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) and the Sabah-ATV Group under the control of the government. Sabah-ATV Group was sold to Çalık? company. Also, during this period, the Uzan Group was disbanded. Star TV, a series of TV channels, and star newspaper, broadcast distribution company, dozens of magazines, etc. confiscated. *Kanaltürk* channel was sold to the gold mine operator and the pro-government *Koza-İpek Group* because of intense financial siege and pressure that after coup d'état as one of the financial resources of *FETO*, they were closed by the government and appointed a trustee. *Aydın Doğan Group* has imposed an astronomical tax penalty of nearly \$ 5 billion for alleged irregularity in one of the holding mergers. Some companies always become potential candidates for public procurement, and they have established close relationships such as *Limak*, *Kalyon*, *Çalık*, and *Cengiz*. For example, in 2013 *Çalık* company sell *Turkuvaz Media Group* to *Kalyon Group*. Moreover, these companies constructed JDP's mega-project jointly such as Istanbul airport.

The media hegemony of JDP is significant for pro-government news. For this reason, finally, *Dogan Media Group* is sold to *Demirören Group* that pro-government and owner of the group is *Yıldırım Demirören* was president of Football federation in past, recently bought National Lottery and this brought along these corruption debates. Especially the construction sector and media were favored by the government. As a result of these initiatives, a strong business class emerged that depends on the government's contracts and public procurement (Esen and Gumuscu, 2020).

Another important element of the coalition is social services provided by JDP to the mostly poor part of society. Social municipal practice in Turkey aims to meet daily and urgent needs of families and individuals rather than as a necessity of social state principles, because of that insufficient presence of the central state in

the field of social welfare provide an auspicious environment for other charities and local government that fill this gap. Moreover, welfare applications in Turkey, social services, and assistance-based benefits of citizens but traditional clientelist and selective policies (Kesgin, 2012). In addition, JDP has expanded social services to poor segments of society such as aids to poor families, public health insurance become compulsory, and having green card become easier (Bugra and Candas,2011).

The fact that one of the most important problems causing the 2002 elections was the economy, which enabled the JDP to pay attention to the economic order in this parallel. In terms of voting potential, the economic concerns of middle- and low-income citizens, which constitute a large part of the society, were considered by the party. JDP has built its many political attitudes based on economic attitudes and data. For this reason, *Erdoğan* has been partially compared with Özal in Neo-liberal economic policies. Turgut Özal makes some claims that each street will have a millionaire during his presidency. These popular promises were signs coming of a business environment.

In Turkey, JDP always becomes an actor to struggle redistribute wealth to middle and lower classes. According to Özdemir (2020), JDP backed on votes of the peripheral middle class in elections. Therefore, JDP has extended social policies to poorer and excluded classes while the benefit of existing members' decreases. Secondly, civil society organizations and local governments focus on increasing social assistance and are well organized. Moreover, JDP has encouraged these organizations to help excluded classes. For example, SOYBIS was introduced as a database to bring aids in an effective way to poor families.

JDP has applied much more comprehensive social policies than other right-wing parties. How JDP separated from others. According to Gürsoy (2019), these are based on strong party organization and civilizational discourse. We see that party organizations can mobilize easily, during the 2016 military coup, President *Erdoğan* organizes the public in the streets very quickly. Furthermore, a lot of different organization focus on different sections of society such as women organizations as KADEM, AK-DER, and unions such as MEMUR-SEN.

Another important point is about JDP become a tool to organize the business of the middle classes. Hadiz (2014) also claims that JDP was successful in bringing pious Turkish bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs of lower classes and social assistance organizations. Even we have a good example is Başakşehir, one of Istanbul's districts. Başakşehir region would become a district municipality in 2008 by merging with different neighborhoods, including Bahçeşehir, where RPP is strong today, and some poor neighborhoods, and JDP would come out first in every election. At the point reached today, the Başakşehir neighborhood offers an important insight into the political tendencies of the middle- and upper-income conservative classes in Turkey. This is a basin where groups integrated with conservative identity codes are heading, but at the class level, it is a basin where the layers of the upper classes of conservatism, which have made a leap, are increasingly heading. Rise of some part of middle class have prepared a life hub at this point and interestingly we see an integration of old periphery with capital power.

To sum up, social coalition theory fits in our Turkey case. Strong and intense relationships between business class, the party and some part of periphery provide strong ground for JDP to thrive. And these interests enable power to the party to consolidate its power.

3.4 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND TURKEY

Turkey and the West have long relations. Since early periods, the interaction between the two cultures was very intense despite Turks' rejection to become Christian. Especially, the Ottoman Empire realize Western superiority in military skills and inventiveness, modernization becomes the central theme of the Ottomans. With modernization steps, the Empire has established the channels of transmission with Western elites. A new army is called *Nizam-ı Cedid* as designed by France advisors. With *Tanzimat*, these efforts become very intense in all aspect of life. After *Tanzimat* era Western powers intense their pressure and the French Government, backed by England and Australia, give nota to accelerate reforms especially for non-Muslims (Lewis, 2002). Ottoman Empire has faced accusations

from western countries because of violence against minority rights within Empire and this brings pressure on the Empire. In addition, against the Egyptian uprising, the Empire seeks support from Western countries. Moreover, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa* has spent many years discussing the main points of edict with foreign state diplomats (Ciftci, 2019). We can say that before the Tanzimat era, reforms mainly were made in the military because the Empire wanted to prevent attacks against the country. However, after Tanzimat edict, it becomes clear that all aspect of social life needs reforms.

After the establishment of modern Turkey, westernization becomes a prior issue for the new country. After World War II, new dynamics emerged, and Turkey has become more dependent on the West because of emerging and increasing Soviet's threat. Turkey has also worked extensively to integrate with the West due to the threat of communism. At the same time, they wanted to avoid being alone by becoming a member of international organizations such as NATO in which put pressure on Turkey to pass multi-party democracy. Shortly after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1958, Greece applied for membership on 15 July 1958. Turkey worried because of the Cyprus issue and more afraid of Greece's rapprochement with the West, Turkey has made an application on 31 July 1959 for the European Economic Community partnerships.

EEC Council of Ministers accepts Turkey's partnership agreement will be valid until settlement has proposed signing the application for membership conditions. The Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 December 1964. Ankara Agreement has constituted the legal base of the European Union's relations with Turkey and implies that the ultimate goal of the EEC-Turkey partnership relations will ends up Turkey's full membership in the Community.

In this period, it is obvious that there are external factors behind the desire to integrate with the West; Communist threat to Turkey push to ally with the USA that has a most powerful army, and with EEC that was becoming an economic powerhouse for the World. Therefore, the Ankara agreement was seen as an important step for integration. Ankara Agreement in which has been planned in three phases as preparatory period, transition period, and final period. The first

period started on December 1, 1964, when the Agreement entered into force. The first phrase aimed to reduce economic differences between the parties and Turkey has not to assume any obligations.

With the Additional Protocol signed on 13 November 1970 and entered into force in 1973, the preparation period foreseen in the Ankara Agreement has ended and the conditions for the "Transition Period" have been determined. In this period, it was planned to ensure the free movement of industrial products, agricultural products, and people between the parties and to complete the Customs Union.

During this period, Greece has risen criticisms against Turkey's membership because of political events such as the Cyprus problem. Especially military coup and execution of Adnan Menderes contributed to the negative image of Turkey.

Turkey-EU relations, from the beginning of 1970 until the second half of the 1980s, were followed by unsteady political and economic reasons. Relations were formally suspended following the 12 September 1980 military coup.

In 1983, the re-establishment of civil administration in Turkey since 1984 and export-led policies and market-oriented economic policies are adopted by Turgut Ozal. Thus began the process of reviving the frozen relations in Turkey-EEC relations.

The necessary preparations were started for the Customs Union to be completed in 1995 as stipulated in the Additional Protocol. At the end of two years of negotiations held on March 5th in 1995, the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU Association Council in accordance with the decision taken at the meeting entered into force on 1 January 1996. Thus, the EU-Turkey Association Relations' "Final Period" has been started.

The political will, which demonstrates its determination on the way to the European Union, has also accelerated the reform efforts. Thus, the harmonization law packages aimed at meeting the political criteria, which are a prerequisite for opening negotiations, have been extensively passed through the Parliament. Reforms that expand the scope of fundamental rights and freedoms, strengthen and secure existing regulations in areas such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of thought, expression, and human rights have continued.

17 December 2004 Brussels Summit, Turkey-EU relations was considered a landmark summit in Turkey's political criteria and decided to start negotiations on October 3, 2005, stating that meets the criteria were sufficient, and Turkey began its EU accession negotiations formally.

As you see Turkey and the West have strong relations and the EU and NATO contributed to consolidate Turkish democracy. However, recently why they fail to prevent democratic backsliding, and how they lose their leverage on Turkey? Changing priorities in Turkish foreign policy provided a useful starting point for us.

The disappearance of Communism has resulted in a new world order after 1990. Especially the most important factor for Turkey has been removed with collapsing of Soviet Union. After that, a new Russian Federation and the rise of China created a new balance of power. Since the period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish elites see Russia as a counterweight against the West in terms of foreign policy. While the Russia-China axis points out that multi-polar world order is getting stronger, on the other hand, it stands out as a new balance factor in foreign policy for Turkey, which is going through a troubled period in its relations with its traditional allies, the USA, and the EU.

Indeed, after 2008 in Turkey and Russia, as well as with China occurred in serious progress in political and economic relations. On the other hand, as many experts also emphasized Turkey's especially since the second half of the 2000s tried to position itself as a rising power in world politics that one can do not ignore. This situation inevitably increases the importance of new global platforms such as BRICS and G-20 for Turkish foreign policy. In addition to all of these, it should not be forgotten that Russia has become an important factor in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean by directly militarily involved in the Syrian crisis in 2015. Geopolitical balance in Syria radically altering by ISIS simultaneously Turkey sees as PYD / YPG as a terrorist organization that has entered tactical cooperation with the US in the field, this alliance has prepared the ground in Syria for Ankara's approach to Russia and Iran.

Another important point is about the losing motivation of Turkey and its citizens. A desperate picture makes the country's motivation down. Moreover,

speeches delivered by the EU and its actors feed this negative situation. The German Christian Democrats and some other actors always emphasize the impossibility of being a member for Turkey that they have a tough stance against Turkey's entry, especially differences such as identity and religion have been seen as fault line and polarization has started to intensify. For example, Christian Democrats Group chairman Wolfgang Schäuble? said that "We should not accept Turkey as a full member because Turkey is not part of Europe." We see the results of these speeches in Turkey. Interestingly, while citizens still support strong participation in the European Union, it does not constitute a factor in political preferences. Even in election campaigns, political parties mention further relations with the EU and debates (Ulusoy,2008). For example, according to recent survey results, we see that the rate of support for the European Union membership exceeded 80 percent, however, the negative image in eyes of voters combined with the idea of whatever we do they will not accept us prevent them from creating pressure on the government for more harmonization with EU values. The Economic Development Foundation (IKV) has published "Turkish Public Opinion Survey on Support for European Union (EU) Membership and Perception on Europe 2019" that when we look at outcomes, we see that 60 percent of citizens view positive for Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) However, only 23 percent of voters believe in that the process will end up full membership. Moreover, the EU's relations with civil society and initiatives are not in accordance with reality and promises (Ketola, 2011). Especially Uslu explains ell in his study that divided process as pre-Helsinki and post-Helsinki. In pre-Helsinki, EU and Turkish elites could not effort to further consolidation of democracy and the EU lost its influence gradually and the carrot of "membership" become harder to reach for Turkey. As a result of this, in the post-Helsinki period, the push-and-pull mechanism lost its functions and demonstrated limited impact (Usul, 2015). In other words, when membership promises lack credibility, leverage does not work anymore (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Other important barriers are about different perspectives of EU and Turkey on domestic problems of Turkey. Especially because of its geographic problems, Turkey has located near the Middle East. It means that security concerns are very high. Turkey has fought against terrorist groups for more than 35 years and this

reason, Turkey is not eager to make some implementation in security laws. Secondly, fundamentalists movements are seen as a threat against secular structure, and this limited actions to further about human rights (Rumford, 2001).

Recent events such as the civil war in Syria and the collapse of Saddam Hussein in the Middle East provide new opportunities for Turkey that become a willingness to fill the power gap in this region. Being regional power is easier in the scenario that is been surrounded by weaker states. Recently, Turkey has built strong relations with its neighbors and presented itself as a mediator for disputes. As a result of this, this desire combined with the negative position of the EU and make Turkey more willing for being regional power (Barysch, 2015).

The final point is about the economy, Turkey was dependent on IMF and World Bank in 2001 (Onis, 2011). The Turkish economy was not fragile during the 2000s and this encouraged the government to take more independent actions. As Ziya Onis (2011) point out that especially after the 2001 crisis, the EU and IMF become a more powerful actor to push both privatization and institutional changes, moreover, when the EU announced Turkey as a candidate country, this motivates Turkey further integration and make more willingness for reforms. And recently, IMF is seen as 'evil' in eyes of Turkish citizens because of populist discourse in Turkey.

Consequently, leverage and linkage of the West and EU have a profound impact on democratic consolidation in Turkey, However, loss of motivation and decline in initiatives led to Turkey find new options. Image of "reluctant democratizer" turn to be perceived as EU's promises will not be kept in eyes of voters (Ulusoy, 2008).

To sum up, With the collapse of the soviets, Turkey's greatest motivation to approach the West disappeared. Later, in the changing paradigm, new threats emerged such as terrorism. The troubles experienced especially in the Middle East and the differences of opinion with Turkey and the Western states, especially the USA, pushed Turkey to find new alternatives for security partners, especially Russia. Recently, the long-term EU candidacy process has caused the Turkish people to take a negative attitude towards the EU. The fact that they believed that they would not be taken because of the identity difference greatly reduced the EU's

pressure on Turkey. There was no pressure on the government to reform under these conditions. In short, while international organizations have had a great influence on democratization in Turkey, this influence has been lost recently and is one of the reasons for democratic backsliding.

3.5 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN TURKEY

Political economy theories generally emphasize the economic level of society. In terms of economic perspective, Economic theories generally believe that a good economy along with democracy is very healthy. Even according to some theories, economic growth is considered a prerequisite of democracy. In this regard, democratic backsliding in Turkey cannot be explained in terms of economic causes. Turkey has made structural changes in the banking system after the 2001 crisis. While still discussing today's problems, attention is drawn to its strong banking structure. In addition, the trade volume has been expanded by making successive trade agreements with different countries. Turkey's economy especially after the JDP power as quickly grabbed a growth rate. They achieved this after a long period by reducing the inflation to single digits in 2004. The positive economic indicators, the increase in the opportunities provided in the field of social assistance and social services, the improvements in the social security system contributed significantly to bringing the JDP to power alone in the 2007 and 2011 elections. JDP, which came to power after the 2001 economic crisis, has resolutely attached importance to democratic and economic reform programs (Onis, 2012). The fact that interest rates decreased to relatively low levels enabled the psychological obstacle in front of investments to be overcome and high rates of increase were recorded in private sector fixed capital investments. The decline in interest rates has increased private consumption through consumer loans. The real appreciation of the Turkish lira and the introduction of deferred consumption enabled private consumption to increase significantly. In addition, the expansion in global markets after the 2001 crisis and cheap credit opportunities caused serious increases in the amount of capital transferred from financial markets to developing countries.

Record growth rates were achieved in 2010-2011 when all sectors contributed to economic growth with the restructuring and revitalization of the real sector. In the same period, Turkey's economy in 2011, after growing by 9.2 percent to 8.5 percent growth rate in China has been the second-fastest growing economy in the world. Moreover, the JDP administration, price stability-oriented comprehensive economic program could continue despite the high estimate in inflation expectations. When we look at the first 13 years of JDP, we generally see an improvement in all economic data. In this period, monetary policy took the place of fiscal policy, and record entries were achieved in foreign capital inflows (Egilmez, 2020).

If we accept that Turkish democratization steps began in 1839 and multiparty regime since 1950, economic conditions are not causing of democratization but an elite-driven movement. And when we look at the process, we see that Turkish democracy has traditional roots in terms of electoral democracy. More interestingly, compared to worse economic times in Turkey, democratic backsliding took place under a better economic environment.

Sometimes economic inequality pushes poor segments of society to favor populist parties for redistribution. In Turkey's case, this theory also failed because JDP rules the country since 2002, which means that democratic adrift did not start after this election but mostly after 2010.

3.6 POLARIZATION IN TURKEY

Turkey was stretched in politics in recent years. Human life and social relations also take their share from this tension, which is felt much more especially during election periods. Polarization has become one of the most important problems in Turkey. Recent surveys reveal how polarization influences citizens that according to one research, people whose views are sought do not want to do business with party supporters they feel distant from, nor do they want their children to be friends or marry one of the "that party" supporters. Turkey takes every social polarization of the field lines can be seen comfortably; The distinction between Shia and Sunni,

minority groups, secular-conservative groups, and center-periphery divide has a profound impact on the shaping of Turkish politics and party behavior.

3.6.1 MAIN DYNAMICS OF POLARIZATION

In Turkey, people have so many identities and carry on their responsibilities. All of them carry some burden and obligation that they run in favor of applying these values in deciding which political preferences they should choose. At this point, we can say that the family background of these voters becomes extremely important. In Turkey, the first fault line is based on a division of secular and conservative family identity. Groups build their daily lives on these bases. Therefore, a tension between secular and conservative life has been the main resource of the electoral democratic process of Turkey. The second main division is sectarian identity between Sunni and Alevis that although the basic rules and beliefs of the two sects are the same, they differ politically. From this political divide, many sects become widespread. Especially during the Ottoman eras, with the increasing influence of the Safavids, intense conflict has been taken place and the effects of conflict in Turkey continued its existence. The third division that we will discuss in the subsequent paragraphs is between ethnic Turkish and ethnic Kurdish. Especially nation-state policies, terror problems, ethnic exclusion and inclusion, and identity politics has been a contentious topic in Turkish politics. Recently, the rise of the People's Democratic Party makes electoral campaigns focus on the Kurdish problem and many politicians are asked about their opinion about the problem by journalists when they participate in political life. Consequently, daily lifestyles, political preferences, and values are shaped as outcomes of these fault lines. Let's examine these polarization dynamics and their consequences in Turkish democracy.

With the beginning of the modernization processes in the Ottoman Empire, the distinction between conservative and modern emerged. this phenomenon has been maintained throughout all modern Turkish history. the center-periphery divide is used to analyze the main dynamics of Turkish politics and Turkish society. we will focus on this concept in following paragraphs.

Karpat states that the factor that determines the change in Turkey is the struggle between the religious conservative group and the reformist secular group. (Karpat, 1996). With Turkey's transition to a multi-party system, the Democrat party representing the periphery and the RPP representing the center constantly clashed. The right-wing parties that were established later generally tended to embrace the legacy of the DP. They positioned themselves against the Kemalist army, especially claiming that the military coup was against them.

As it can be understood from the novels and books about the villages at the beginning of the republican period, the villager and the intellectual relationship in Turkey was extensively discussed and it was emphasized that the differences were very large. For this reason, the writers of Village Novels, especially bureaucrats, give us very important data on the environment-center relationship (Kindirci, 2016). The observations of Yakup Kadri, the author of the novel is called *Yaban*, are important at this point: "The people of Anatolia had a soul, you could not penetrate, they had a cage, you could not illuminate, they had a body, you could not feed." At this point, the intellectuals see the people in the Anatolia countryside as a society that needs to be educated. But the main point that should not be overlooked is that these intellectuals do not understand the language of the Anatolian people and do not share a similar mindset. We see that there are deep differences between the Intellectual group, who grew up in the Balkans and Istanbul, and the people who live in rural that the newly established state in Ankara is trying to make reforms in these regions. At the beginning of the republican period, the founding individuals aim to transform rural sides and went to rural areas, but because economic and social factors were ignored, no success was achieved. Although Kemalism brought the revolution to the cities, it could not achieve the same success in the villages (Lewis, 2000). Therefore, the village and city could not catch harmony in the new state. Moreover, in the press, ridicule against the villagers is at a very high level. Even liberal newspapers like *Vatan* included cartoons mocking the villagers (Kendirci, 2016). As can be seen from here, there was a serious center-periphery problem in Turkey's first years.

With urbanization, especially after 1950, the migration of the countryside to populated cities brought new dynamics. At this point, it is vital to understand the

integration of these comings. Yakut Sencer's book *Urbanization in Turkey* has reached very important findings. According to Spencer, traditional families have welcomed only the economic part of cities that have complex socio-economic lifestyles. On the social side, they resisted change (Sencer, 1979). There was a resistance against the negative aspects of the city. According to these data, it is difficult to say that the newcomers are in a state of complete integration with the city even when the urbanization is completed. Again, according to Dr. Sencer's research, 22 percent of the people who came to the city stated that the difference in living between people is very high.

The polarization that started under the center-periphery in Turkey continued later by being reflected in the political party preferences. However, there has been an elite shift with the neo-conservative segment, which has become rich in recent years, and the new elites have settled in the center. Therefore, the center-periphery explanation has become much more complex in recent years. Turkish politics, which continued in a two-party structure until 1960, found the opportunity to represent many ideologies in the liberal and free environment offered by the new constitution after the military coup. However, the 1980 coup d'état that followed immediately caused the elimination of some small groups. In this period, while there were fights based on the right-left, this situation started to change with the military coup. With the effect of the elimination of right and left groups by military force and the removal of the people from politics for a period, this fight started to lose its tension. It has left its place to the secular-religious axis. According to the research of Carkoglu and Hinich, two basic dynamics have come to the fore in Turkey, these are the Turkish-wolf and secular-religious distinction.

To fully understand the polarization in Turkey, we need to analyze the fears of the conservatives well. Especially if it started with the closure of the Welfare party is called *Refah Parti* (Wealth Party, RP). When the Welfare Party came to power, the conflict between the Kemalist state organs and the party reached its highest level. In this period when the opinion that "the regime was threatened" was frequently voiced, the Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Public Prosecutor's Office warned the party about the provincial organization officials who wore uniforms and berets during Erbakan's trip to Kayseri on January 24, 1997. Stating that the

situation in question is "contrary to the Law on Political Parties", the Chief Prosecutor's Office demanded that the Welfare Kayseri Provincial Executive Board be dismissed within 30 days. The Office of the Chief Prosecutor also conveyed to the party that "if the termination is not done, a lawsuit will be filed against RP with a request for closure". Then, the "Jerusalem Night" was organized by WP's Sincan Mayor Bekir Yıldız on January 31, 1997, with the participation of Iran's Ambassador Mohammad Rıza Bagheri and some anti-secular shows exhibited, caused the "regime debates" to flare up even more. On February 1, 1997, Prime Minister Erbakan opened the decree "freeing the headscarf in universities" for signature in the Council of Ministers, despite the voices of objections from the public and the reaction of some ministers from the coalition party is called True Path Party that "we will not sign". On February 2, 1997, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, and the State Security Court (DGM) Chief Prosecutor's Office launched separate investigations against the Welfare Party mayor Yıldız, who organized the "Jerusalem Night". Speaking at the night in question, Bagheri, the Iranian Ambassador in Ankara, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protest. Among these developments, there was the event of "Tanks passing through Sincan province", which took its place in history as an unforgettable image of the February 28 process. In Sincan, on February 4, 1997, 15 tanks and 20 carriages passed through the district and went to the exercise area in Yenikent. All these events led to serious political discussions, including the then President Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller, who conveyed their discomfort about the process to Prime Minister Erbakan. The developments led to a rift among the coalition partners. The tension between the politicians also found a response on the community base. In this context, a rally with broad participation was held in Ankara by the female representatives of non-governmental organizations. Iranian Ambassador Bagheri, on the other hand, had to go to his country due to the increasing reactions after his speeches at Jerusalem Night. In the process that resulted in the closure of the Welfare Party, especially the conservative groups began to experience an intense depression. These fears were constantly passed on, especially to new generations. At this point, if we look at political psychology, it takes place through collective trauma transfer processes (Fried, 2007). Here, the

concept of trauma defines the lasting impact of the bad and bloody events that societies have experienced in their past, and society and its future generations carry these fears. These traumatic effects, especially urbanization and the memories of the terrible military coup, were transferred to the next generations. Then, Recep Tayyip *Erdoğan* read a modified version of the soldier's prayer written by Ziya Gökalp for the Balkan War in 1912 during the rally; "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers" he was tried at the Diyarbakir State Security Court for four months. As a result of the trial, he committed the crime of "openly inciting the people to hatred and enmity by discriminating against religion and race", according to article 312/2 of the Turkish Penal Code. He was sentenced to prison and completed his sentence on July 24, 1999. "But this incident caused the religious people to look at him with sympathy, and the conservative section to look at *Erdoğan* with sympathy. This mobilization gave hope to the young group of the Welfare Party for a new party. Later, during the JDP rule, the conflict was constantly and passed between the government and the army. In this period, *Erdoğan* constantly showed himself as the voice of the people and oppose the corrupt elite. In this period, it is interesting that there are moves from both sides to polarize. One of these is the Republic Meetings, the rallies held before the 2007 Turkish presidential election against the possible presidential candidacy of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip *Erdoğan* or another politician from JDP. In the announcement of the rallies held in April and May 2007 in big cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, the message of "support your republic" was used. Although the rallies were held in many city centers, due to the homogeneous identity of the masses, they could not be successful in localization and creating power. The rallies, which were organized solely based on "secularism" and fed from a narrow political framework, had difficulty in contacting the society. Most importantly, it did not leave behind a residue of struggle and culture. It is not difficult to detect that the ideological messages of the rallies were surrounded by nationalism. In this state, the chance of contact with other identities of the rallies, which are stuck in the Turkish identity, is crippled from the beginning. Because of its exclusionary character, this attempt failed to include other segments of society. As a result of these events, polarization has become intense. And Turkey's fast-

paced agenda has resulted in the production of language that will constantly feed polarization. In the last period, polarization has become much more visible with the alliances of the Republic is called *Cumhur ittifakı* and the Nation is called *Millet ittifakı*. Recently, after two camps have emerged in Turkish politics, the polarizing discourse began to question the legitimacy of the opponent. While describing the People's Alliance as only seeking the service of the nation, President *Erdoğan* also argues that the purpose of the Nation Alliance is to bring the extensions of terrorist organizations to the municipal councils and bureaucracy (DeutschWelle, 2019). Now let's look at the polarization studies measured in Turkey.

There are very important studies in the field of polarity in Turkey, one of them is the research conducted by Aygören and Yılmaz, and the results are very interesting. One of the most important findings revealed by the research is that the four main elements that we define as (1) Religiosity, (2) Economic Expectations for the Future, (3) Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and (4) Modern-Traditional Approach are the most important factors that determine the mutual polarization of voters. Moreover, as religiosity increases, there is a tendency towards JDP, and as the trend of modernity increases in the modern-traditional range, there is a tendency towards RPP. In other words, the voting behavior of the voters is not heterogeneously distributed within the society, and this causes that parties produce politics to aim only at their voters. This results in the parties using a language aimed at consolidating their polarizing groups while making policies and producing campaigns. Especially because of the JDP's alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party, the conservative language started to give way to a more nationalist tone.

The most important study on this subject is the research on the dimensions of polarization in Turkey, regularly conducted by Turkuazlab. The results of the research give very important data about the views of the voters about political parties in Turkey. The top priority and the most problematic part for democracy are that each party voters can see a party that never votes for it. At this point, Turk-Kurd's ethnicity plays an important role. The rate of those who feel distant from the People's Democratic Party ranks first with 40 percent. This proves that ethnic identity is an important indicator of polarization in Turkey. The research focuses

on three important points: social distance among party supporters, the moral superiority of party supporters, and political intolerance towards other party supporters. Political party supporters refer to the supporters of their parties as being patriotic (87 percent), working for the benefit of the country (86 percent); but they see and identify other parties as a tyrant (79 percent) and posing a threat to the country (78 percent). At this point, we see that the party voters exhibit behavior that finds the dimension of hostility towards other parties, not politically. In particular, the intensity of revanchist behaviors has increased this tendency and fear, one of the reasons for this is that the sad and pernicious events that took place in the past are kept on the agenda repeatedly by using televisions and communication tools. According to the research study, Turkishness is the most important identity for 18 percent of the interviewees. This is followed by Kemalism with 11 percent, Conservatism with 10 percent, education with 10 percent, and Kurdishness with 10 percent. Religiosity (8 percent) and Nationalism (8 percent) were stated at relatively lower rates; Modernity (6 percent), Nationalism (3 percent), and Secularism (3 percent) were stated as primary identities by very few people. Another issue is social superiority, JDP Party and NMP supporters generally believe that their group has a superior position in society. PDP supporters are generally the group that claims to be the least superior. determined by output. Consequently, polarization in Turkey has both psychological and sociological dimensions (Turkuzlab, 2020). To summarize, polarization in Turkey is mostly determined by ethnic identity and ideological differences. The two groups deal with each other not only based on their political and identity differences, but also see others as a threat to national identity. The concept of the enemy tends to see the opposing group as the reason for all the mistakes in the country. This highlights the management of defeating the opposing group instead of focusing on the solution in the main problems in the country.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

My thesis has applied the most discussed democratic backsliding theories as international leverage, political economy, polarization, populism, social coalition theory, and political structures theories to our case countries separately and investigated which ones are similar

and which are different. Our research focused on the reasons for democratic backsliding in Turkey and Hungary.

Our examinations show that both countries have similar problems. At this point, polarization stands out as the most important factor in both countries. These countries experienced a long period of war before independence process. War brings destruction and has been maintained for a long time with vivid examples in the minds of the ruling elites of both countries. Afterward, these war memories continued to bloom for new generations. Case countries, which are war zones, have entered wars of independence to get rid of this situation. Thus, the reforms initiated to modernize came from the top and this made the distinction between reformers and traditionalists. However, the communist experience of Hungary caused these discussions to be overshadowed for a long time. Just in this period, military tutelage in Turkey gradually emerged as the power behind politics. After the 1990s, Hungary rapidly democratized and was shown as a model country. elites had agreed on democracy in both countries.

On the other hand, both publics had deep ideological concerns. Interestingly, there are no economic differences and class conflict at the base of polarization, the difference is mostly due to ideological concerns. both countries have agreed on a liberal market economy. Although the socialist wing was influential in Hungary after 1990s, it has lost its influence since 2006. Therefore, it can be seen that parties agree on market economy in the economic systems in Hungary. But later, the secular-tradition separation seemed to emerge as a polarization source. The polarization in society has greatly reduced the possibility of voters voting for other parties in both countries. Ezra Klein (2020) claims that polarization reaches its peak in places where individuals have no chance to move and where fifty percent of the society is divided. When we look at the last elections in both countries, we see that a political grouping split almost exactly in the middle. JDP won the elections with 52 percent and *Orbán's Fidesz* with 48 percent against the other parties. Under these circumstances, in both countries, polarizing language and discourses came from both the government and the opposition and contributed a lot to the deepening of this separation. However, recently, the opposition parties understood that they could not defeat the governments without uniting. As a result of this search for an alliance, parties with different ideological and ethnic camps had to come together. As a result of this, we see an opposition that has started to use a more moderate language in order not to weaken

the fragile alliances. Consequently, polarization has had a devastating effect on the democracies of both countries.

The thesis focuses on the relations of states with the European Union as a second variable. The relations of both countries with Europe show similar sociological and psychological characteristics. An attempt and a desire under the leadership of the elite, but the people who think that they are the periphery of Europe in a pessimistic way. Both countries have identity problems, which means that Turks and Hungarians do not see themselves as fully European. While there is no such problem especially in Western European countries, an ideological mindset given by the Slavic and communist experience in the Eastern Balkan countries continues to stand as a psychological barrier to Europeanness. In Turkey, on the other hand, this comes to the fore more on religious identity. Many people, both from the elite and from the public, look at the marriage between Christian Europe and Muslim Turkey with a very skeptical view. Under these circumstances, it is left to the attempt of the elites based on elite-driven that both countries cannot connect organically. However, especially with the encouragement of the elites, the two countries took positive steps towards becoming a member of the EU and Hungary succeeded in this. EU membership has been very influential in countries' democracies and enacting laws on human rights. After 1990, the two countries made great efforts to integrate their legal systems and markets into the EU. Turkey did not execute the terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan, that made illegal and bloody acts for many years and removed the execution from the legal system. But lately, both countries have been experiencing abrasive problems with the EU. The loss of the candidacy aim caused a serious loss of motivation in the states. After Hungary became a member, the opinion that the EU did not care about the problems of the people increased. The 2008 crisis created a favorable political atmosphere for populist leaders and movements such as Jobbik and Fidesz, reducing faith in the liberal economy. In Turkey, on the other hand, the long candidacy process slowly began to reduce the belief and excitement of the EU. Turkish people, who were already skeptical of the EU, started to look at the EU's pessimistic behavior towards Turkey ideologically. This prevents the public from putting pressure on the government for EU reforms. The political stance and behaviors of the EU are not considered honest and true by the citizens of both countries. Recently, statements from the leading countries of the EU are also very injurious for the Turkish government and people. Germany said

that from the beginning of the negotiation process, with Merkel's coming to power, it was against Turkey's membership. She suggested the privileged partnership model instead of membership. When we looked at France, Sarkozy's statement that "Turkey is not European" had a great impact on Turkey. In other words, we can say that there is a tendency not to see Turkey as a part of the EU culturally, geographically, and politically. On the other hand, Turkey has lost its support coming from some countries that are among other member states such as Britain and Finland. the EU has now become reluctant to offer a membership perspective to Turkey. However, recently, Turkey's image in Europe, especially regarding rights and freedoms, has deteriorated considerably. With the strengthening of the far right and anti-Turkey views, it has become quite risky to defend Turkey's membership in the EU today. In Hungary, *Orbán* and Fidesz claim to solve the country's fundamental problems and represent very well the view that the EU is preventing this. This pushes EU policies towards a very weak position in the eyes of the people. EU pressure is at a weak point in the Hungarian people, and this results in the inability of even the opposition parties to develop policies on this issue. As a result, the EU had a direct impact on the democratization and development of human rights in both countries in the past. However, the developing dynamics and chronic problems that could not be resolved in any way resulted in the citizens of both countries taking a skeptical attitude towards the EU. This has eliminated the possibility of the public exerting pressure on governments. In the light of these developments, the loss of the EU's power of pressure can be shown as a reason for democratic regression for both countries.

Another variable that our thesis examines is political institutions, and at this point, we see that the two countries are separated in terms of the historical process. The first difference is that while Turkey started its democratization movements in the Ottoman period, Hungary was struggling for independence in 1900s. Therefore, Turkey's democratic experience goes backward till 1840. Despite two military coups, Turkey still has an old parliamentary tradition. Hungary, on the other hand, came under the control of the Soviets in a short time after its independence. Under the communist experience, democratic institutions and the mindset of the public did not develop enough. When we examine the theories on this subject, they mostly focus on the fact that the errors and disorders in the political system cause democratic backsliding. But in both countries, we see that these theories have failed. When we look at the reasons, Turkey has a long

parliamentary past. Turkey has the highest level of coalition experience till the 1960s. It is among the states that grant women the earliest right to vote and be elected. Moreover, it has a history where parties from all wings of political ideology formed a government with coalitions. It is a country where sometimes becomes authoritarian but sometimes a liberal atmosphere prevails. In this case, if we consider that political institutions are placed by imitation, especially from western democracies, we see that these theories fail. On the other hand, Turkey has recently switched to the presidential system, but we can see it because of the period when Turkey started to become authoritarian. Hungary, on the other hand, underwent rapid democratization after 1990 and laid the foundations of a solid parliamentary democracy. This rapid democratization gained the appreciation of the western powers and was shown as an exemplary country among the post-Soviet countries.

Hungary has also built a western political system, like Turkey. It started to adapt to the market economy effectively after 1990 with the parliamentary assembly. At this point, we also focused on the electoral system. The Hungarian electoral system is designed to give the winner more seats than they win, but to exclude smaller parties from parliament. This gives disproportionate power to parties that are single-government parties. This majority had an effect, especially in the cartel laws that Fidesz made changes. At this point, it can be said that the electoral system has contributed to authoritarianism. But the electoral system was also valid for previous governments. At this point, there is a similarity with Turkey. While JDP won with 34 percent, it had a representation of up to 60 percent in the parliament. At this point, this representation ratio has provided both governments with the opportunity to live and run comfortably. However, one of the years in which the most democratic breakthroughs were made in Turkey coincides with this parliamentary period. This point can be a bit confusing. However, although the conclusion we have reached here is controversial, the effect of the electoral system in both countries was limited. Another theory is that while traditional parties collapse, they are replaced by new illiberal parties, thus damaging democracy. But at this point, the two countries showed similar developments. Although a few traditional parties have disappeared in both countries after the rise of government parties, other parties have survived and had a long history, then started to struggle against the government. In this regard, while similar ideological parties survive in both countries, class differences are less striking in Turkey.

One of the most striking reasons for backsliding is populism in both countries. With the end of the separation of powers, the disappearance of institutions that control the executive, such as an independent judiciary and a free press, and the loss of importance of the legislature, the populist leader remains the only center of power in both countries. There is mass support behind Fidesz and JDP which uses populist rhetoric. Over time, the belief that the leader has "superior human" qualities becomes established. Turkish people and Hungarian people pay attention to charisma and masculine politics. With this belief, a bond of belonging is formed against the leader. People surrender their destiny to the leader, and this is called "*Beka meselesi*" in Turkey. This allows the leader to mobilize the masses against internal and external enemies that interestingly both countries draw George Soros as an enemy of the country. In Hungary, Soros is seen as a betrayer that removes Hungarians and Europeans with Muslim people, on the contrary, in Turkey *Erdoğan* marks him as planner behind the Gezi protests. The use of violence, the intimidation of the people with fear, the creation of a police force loyal to the leader and the party for this purpose, as well as the establishment of a paramilitary force are integral elements of populism, and we see the same patterns in both countries. At the same time, the only way populist governments can maintain power is to keep the opposition in pieces. For these reasons, both governments produce policies that keep away opponents from union against the governments.

Populism and polarization are very intertwined concepts, as can be understood from our study. Populism has a huge impact on both polarization and democracy. This does not always mean that populism has a negative effect. Fidesz, which emerged as a movement of young provincial and opposition lawyers during the "transformation" period of Hungary after the Cold War, was previously an advocate of "democratization" and "Europeanization". After coming to power for the first time in the early 2000s, the leader of the party, Orbán, who experienced that political power can be lost as quickly as it was gained, aimed to stay in power "at any cost" after he came to power for the second time in 2010. Populist discourse is a widely used concept in both countries to delegitimize opponents. It is a frequently used phrase that especially opposition parties serve foreign powers, not the purpose of the country. And this discourse is often fed by the past fears of the two nations. There is a differentiation in xenophobia. The typical feature of populism is the introduction of an enemy figure to be "demonized" and the propaganda

that the power (or the populist movement) is under attack by internal and external enemies. At this point, for Fidesz, the enemy is more characterized with anti-immigrant discourse, while in Turkey it is more anti-Western. Especially the long-term Ottoman and western wars have created a situation of constant competition among the people on certain issues. Hence, the West is not an opponent that Turkey needs to integrate, but an opponent that Turkey needs to pass. Consequently, populism has a negative impact on both countries.

Another variable is crony capitalism and social coalitions theory. At this point, we reached similar findings in both countries. First, the relations of governments with the business world are very complex and intense. In both countries, governments regularly pass laws to control the media and the press more easily. Especially in both countries, we see that the media bosses are people from the business elites. Public contracts generally go to well-known and pro-government people. This causes the rapid decline of competition, especially in the market economy. The weakening of the competition, on the other hand, is discouraging, especially for entrepreneurs. Economically, supporter business elites are in constant contact with the government. However, this is not in the form of a pressure group but continues with more bilateral relations. These bosses make propaganda in favor of the government in the media and to have publications that defame the opponents. then these broadcasts are not penalized, but opposition channels are put in a difficult situation by fines and closure. In return, there is the structuring and reach to a tax amnesty. Consequently, we find that there is a strong connection between crony capitalism and democratic backsliding in both countries.

As the last variable, we examined economic theories. These theories are mostly prepared by examining World War II. Radical ideologies took root in Germany and USSR, especially in countries that could not handle the economic burden and crises brought on by World War I. Soon after, fascism and communism put an end to democracies and paved the way for WWII. Economic problems can still create a favorable environment for the rise of radical parties. Fidesz and JDP came after these economic crises. But especially in the first years of JDP rule, they made very important democratic reforms. For Turkey and Hungary, the democratic withdrawal started to be said more after 2010, that is, for one of the best periods economically. In Hungary, the effects of the 2008 crisis were felt closely and affected the 2010 elections, but there was no major change in

economic evaluations until 2015, but we see that Fidesz kept its votes in this process. Likewise, JDP managed to maintain its votes for 20 years. Even in the recent economic crisis, it did not experience any decrease in its votes. This shows that these governments have survived ideologically rather than economically. Consequently, we can find that Economic crises cannot be considered as one of the causes of democratic backsliding for these two countries.

Overall, this thesis seeks to offer a comparative understanding of how democratic backsliding takes place in Turkey and Hungary. According to the theories examined in this thesis, the causes of democratic regression in Hungary and Turkey are largely similar. Populism and polarization stand out as the leading causes. Later, the decline in relations and pressure with the EU and international organizations have reduced the motivation for democratic reforms in both countries. However, although economic reasons played a role in the coming to power of both parties, the crises failed in affecting the vote rates of these parties significantly. At this point, we see that polarization takes precedence over economic concerns. Democracy has run along with the market economy in the historical process. But ideological polarization demands intense sacrifice, which means that the other camp's victory means disaster for the country. The biggest contributor to polarization comes from charismatic leaders and their populist rhetoric. The fact that the people of both countries have developed a skeptical view of the West in the historical process has also developed immunity against external pressures.

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Katıldığı Proje ve Toplantılar			
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